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THE CHINESE CRISIS:
CAUSES AND CHARACTER

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The conflicting news that filters out of China is still in the focus of public attention. Although today it is difficult to strike the imagination with a new political phenomenon and although the Chinese kaleidoscope seems to have lost its nature of sensation, the significance of what has happened is only now beginning to be realized. Yet to see through the Chinese ravings of the last two years will really be possible only after the dust raised by the *hungweipings* (red guards) and *tsaofan* (red rebels) settles.

But even now certain conclusions can be drawn, which will remain true whatever the future developments in China.

This book is concerned only with the aspects of the Chinese crisis that have manifested themselves so definitely that they can be regarded as obvious facts.

It is not the author's purpose to recall all the Chinese developments in their chronological sequence. Undoubtedly, it is the roots of these developments—social, political and ideological—that are most interesting to examine. After all, it is impossible to see the whole Chinese scene without first making it clear whether or not the "cultural revolution" is something only to be expected or a happenstance. Otherwise, all forecasts, however tempting they may seem, will in the final analysis prove flimsy and unconvincing.

CHAPTER I

IN THE CLUTCHES OF CHINESE TRADITION

Marxist research works on China of the last few years contain a very true observation—the important role of the “petty-bourgeois medium.” What is the “petty-bourgeois medium?” Should every country where this factor exists go through a series of shocks after the Chinese pattern? Not at all. Important though this factor is, it cannot explain everything. Take the peasantry, for one. They are not the same everywhere, for the historical, national, economic and other factors are different. Therefore the issue should be viewed from different angles.

Chauvinism Yesterday and Today

It is general knowledge that to win political freedom does not mean that all the economic and social problems facing a developing country have been solved. To attain a steep rise in the standard of living tremendous capital investments are required. It is not an easy matter for an under-developed country to amass such capital—foreign aid will not meet all the needs; work skills are below the modern standard; there is a want of technical specialists and trained personnel to work in other spheres, and it is impossible to train them in two or three years. As a

matter of fact, most of humanity are still threatened with poverty and undernourishment. The political leaders that have come to power in Asian and African countries are forced to seek loans from other governments and meanwhile urge their fellow-countrymen to work in the name of future blessings. It is no secret, for instance, that India—Asia's second biggest nation—is still unable to feed herself. China, too, has been importing millions of tons of wheat for years (we shall not go into the reasons just now).

When such a situation develops it is only natural that mass pogrom movements should originate, especially so if they are encouraged from “above”, if the leaders see no other way out of the objective difficulties. If such a thing happens politicians will emerge who will try to win popularity by playing on the feelings of the disturbed masses, fanning nationalistic hysteria and feeding the nation on hatred instead of rice.

It goes without saying, that this does not refer to sober-minded national leaders who realize that the basic task facing them is to create and not to destroy. But it is hard for a leader whose head swims with incense and who has been wallowing in flattery and worship, to keep his sense of proportion.

What has happened in China of late can be regarded as a shift to reckless nationalism and wild chauvinism. It would be well to recall, that in Europe this kind of nationalism and chauvinism was one cause of that great tragedy—the Second World War.

There is much in common between the aggressive chauvinistic movements of the West and the

"pogrom situation" that has developed in Asia: 1) the masses have been forced out of their environment and severed from their traditions and are in a state of confusion and political indifference; 2) education has caused the emergence of the type of semi-intellectual, who is sufficiently educated to throw off moral taboos but not enough to know genuine morality, sufficiently skilled to organize a movement, lead it to victory and hold power for a time, but not far-sighted enough to find a real way out of the objective contradictions and therefore jumping to a wrong way—external expansion. This type is hostile to real intellectuals who know too much; to foreigners (particularly to "domestic" foreigners) who allow themselves too much freedom; to the rich who really have too much.¹ The "little man" who is used to being ordered about readily worships this type and makes him an idol.

The peculiarity of Asian countries (as compared to European) mainly consists in their economic (hence military) weakness. The Asian demagogues are not yet strong enough to plunge into a venture of the scope of the last "big war." Whatever Mao Tse-tung's original plans, he was building an economy at first, not fighting. Now that common sense seems to have left him, Mao Tse-tung tries to create a psychological atmosphere in which any venture (even military) will seem justified.

¹ *It is an interesting fact that during pseudo-revolutionary mass movements the bourgeoisie usually manages to get off with a bribe. The same applies to China: the intellectuals have been persecuted for ten years, Party workers, for two years while the bourgeoisie who are ready to cooperate with the Mao regime have been spared so far.*

It is easier for the country whose population has reached 700 million to build a war industry than to raise the standard of living. It likewise seems simpler to seize by force what requires many years of creative work and international cooperation.

The logical question arises: what prospects are there for nationalism in China? In other words, how long can the artificially fanned chauvinistic hysteria survive? It must be pointed out that while the national liberation fight the Chinese people waged for ages was fully justified and historically progressive, it also yielded its by-product—elements of nationalism.

China's seclusion and self-isolation is one of the reasons for the fact that the Chinese people, the peasantry and other sections of the population have no idea of the external world or, if they do, it is a very distorted one.

The struggle between internationalism and nationalism has been going on in the Chinese Communist Party ever since it was set up in 1921. Many outstanding leaders, among them Li Ta-chao and Chu Chiu-po, did much to defend internationalism.

One of the most important tasks facing the Party at that time was the struggle against narrow nationalism and "great-Han" chauvinism—something which originated and flourished even in medieval China, proclaiming the indisputable priority of everything Chinese over everything foreign and cultivating a scornful attitude toward non-Chinese peoples who were considered "barbarians."

Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues did not me-

rely take the national feelings of the Chinese people into account but made them into an absolute. Nationalism became a boomerang in a way since the Communist Party leaders themselves became increasingly influenced by it. Finally some nationalistic distortions developed into what today amounts to a uniform nationalistic and chauvinistic platform, proclaiming the primacy of the interests of one nation (the Chinese), expressed in a narrow and fallacious way, over the interests of the socialist community and the entire world revolutionary movement.

This means that there has been a merging of an objective and a subjective factors working in the same direction. Therefore, it seems there is a very real prospect for the atmosphere of chauvinism to persist unless there is a drastic change in the stand taken by the leading force in Chinese society.

Marxism or a Caricature of Marxism

How could such a crisis develop in a country whose ruling Party adhered to the theories of Marx and Lenin? How could Marxists allow the emergence or sanction the ravings of the red guards?

The Christian religion regards as Christians all who have been christened, attend Church and pray to God. But a person can hardly be regarded a Marxist only because he has joined the Party and attends party meetings. Christianity is a religion in which the communicant has only to perform a series of purely symbolic acts whereupon

it is assumed that the Holy Ghost will descend upon him, relieving him of the need for understanding the gospel. Marxism is a science and the Holy Ghost does not communicate the ideas of *Dialectics of Nature* or *Theses on Feuerbach*. One must read and understand them. And this is not so simple. Even in Europe the spreading of Marxist ideas was accompanied by a degree of vulgarisation.

Once reading Lafargue's interpretation of Marxism, Marx exclaimed: "If this is Marxism, I'm not a Marxist!" And it was not that Lafargue had made bad mistakes. Being Marx's son-in-law he knew his works well enough not to make any. But any popular summary was bound to lay emphasis on what was easiest to understand rather than on what was most important. What is most easily understood is not trite when used in its context and connected with other ideas but if it is taken out of its context and used as a thesis or an aphorism, it very often becomes a banality. Was there any need to write *Capital* if the essence of Marxism could be expressed in a few statements like "one must first eat and drink enough and dress properly," "the world should be reshaped" or "religion is opium?" Can a person be considered a Marxist if he knows that "idealism is a road to priesthood" (Lenin) and does not know that "wise idealism is closer to wise materialism than stupid materialism is?"

And if today one looks through the book, *Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung*, which contains many well-known Marxist stipulations and definitions—from the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to "freedom of discussion"—one can only wonder at

their interpretation. What's the use of good words if they are employed to express the opposite meaning? "Freedom of discussion" in China? Yes, if this refers to the public denunciation of people, followed by ridiculous charges when they are unable to justify themselves and are forced to plead guilty for fear of victimization. The "dictatorship of the proletariat" in China? Yes, if this is understood as absolute rule resting on bayonets at a time the working class has practically no influence on state management and its material needs, even of the humblest kind, are regarded as "counter-revolutionary."

The gap between word and deed in Maoism is so great that the theory itself becomes increasingly functional and auxiliary and is "fitted" into the requirements of present-day tactics. If this fact is ignored it will be impossible to understand what seems to be an unexpected crucial change in China's ideological slogans or the arbitrary interpretation of social formulas, depending on the circumstances. Words mean nothing to Mao Tse-tung—they can be explained in any way he pleases. That was exactly what happened when the failure of the "great leap forward" and the "people's communes" became obvious to Chairman Mao and other leaders. Both campaigns have been practically given up but formally they are still on the agenda. As for the leadership's own mistakes, everything was done to hush them up and conceal them by shifting the blame on to local cadres who, it was said, had not understood "the brilliant direction." The stock phrases used to damn imperialism do not in the least bother the Mao group when it needs to com-

promise against all principles and strike deals with the very imperialists.

The Chinese approach reduces creative Marxism to a system of dogmas, and the scientific problems Marxism deals with, to a collection of ready-made decisions. Although the "theoreticians" of the Mao type have learned a few of the conclusions to which Marx came, they fail to communicate the essence of his philosophy. Yet Marx himself constantly searched for better definitions, rejected old conceptions and created new ones. If one ignores Marx's scientific inquisitiveness and the tireless quest of his mind, his works become an assortment of quotations. One can learn all of them by heart and not understand Marx, since there are several pronouncements on every serious problem and none of them quite the same, having been said at different times and in different contexts. This is where the problem of interpretation arises, which calls for independent mental effort.

Even merely to understand an interpretation one has to be highly cultured and well-educated. As Lenin said, one cannot become a Communist without having enriched one's memory with the knowledge of all the wealth created by humanity.

In the past Marxism was only accessible to intellectuals and the Marxist character of the Russian working-class movement is to be explained not only by the specific qualities of the Russian proletariat but also by the efforts of revolutionary intellectuals who spread the ideas of socialism, of Marx and Engels, among the workers. The theoreticians of scientific communism repeatedly emphasized that if left to itself the working class

of their epoch was only capable of a trade-union movement.

In his book *What is to be Done?* Lenin explained this idea in detail. He quoted a "profoundly true and important words of Karl Kautsky" (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 5, p. 383) to the effect that "socialist consciousness is something introduced into the proletarian class struggle from without and not something that arose within it spontaneously" (p. 384) and that "there can be no talk of an independent ideology formulated by the working masses themselves in the process of their movement. . . ." "This does not mean, of course, that the workers have no part in creating such an ideology. They take part, however, not as workers, but as socialist theoreticians, as Proudhons and Weitlings." (*Ibid.*)

Who could instil socialist, Marxist consciousness in the mass of Chinese workers and peasants? Chinese intellectuals? But what was their knowledge of European cultural traditions from which Marxism had emerged? How deeply did the Chinese students of the 20's and 30's understand Marx?

Let us examine this question from the standpoint of two terms—"dictatorship" and "communism."

Was there any special reason behind Marx's choice of the term "dictatorship" when characterizing revolutionary power (instead of, say, "despotism")?

For a person who is acquainted with European culture this is a very simple question. Dictatorship originally meant the extraordinary powers granted to a statesman of Republican Rome for a short

term and under extraordinary circumstances. In such conditions dictatorship was despotism within democracy, within the system of republican institutions, a despotism restrained by the spirit of the Republic. The republican spirit and way of life made the dictator an ordinary citizen with ordinary rights once his term of power had expired. On the contrary, despotism is autocracy in conditions of a civilisation that recognizes autocracy as an institution having no other power above itself. Marx usually employed the term "despotism" with the attribute "Asian." This is natural since the "classical" examples of despotism were provided by the ancient East—Egypt, Mesopotamia and China. Unlike the situation in ancient Peloponnesus, Asian despotism meant the ruler's open tyranny supported by a ramified bureaucracy and the army.

"Unlimited power" is invariably understood as despotism in the historical context of China. Without progressive intellectuals who have adopted the democratic ideas of political freedom (as Russian intellectuals did), the idea of revolutionary dictatorship becomes the idea of *revolutionary despotism*. There were no such people in China either in the 19th or in the 20th centuries, because Chinese intellectuals who had been isolated from the cultural traditions of other peoples to a considerable extent, were brought up on the basis of purely national, conservative ethical conceptions.

In Marx's definitions of *communism* the words "free" and "freedom" are constantly repeated: "association in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all"; "a leap from the realm of necessity to the

kingdom of freedom." Then there is the famous definition from the third volume of *Capital*: "In fact, the realm of freedom actually begins only where labour which is determined by necessity and mundane considerations ceases; thus in the very nature of things it lies beyond the sphere of actual material production. . . . Beyond it begins that development of human energy which is an end in itself, the true realm of freedom, which, however, can blossom forth only with this realm of necessity as its basis." (pp. 799-800)

The formula "from each according to his ability, to each according to his needs" can be correctly understood only through the prism of these ideas. The requisite for its realization is a tremendous leap in production and the development of mental work into the prevalent form of socially essential labour. On this basis any essential labour will give way to free spiritual endeavour. And it depends on the extent to which spiritual requirements become decisive, that man can actually give society as much as his ability permits and receive as much as he needs.

Thus Marx's communism is the acme of a thousand-year European liberation movement and the struggle for the ideal of freedom. It is also an enrichment of the ideas of political and spiritual freedom by the idea of economic freedom, and not rejection of political and spiritual freedom for the sake of providing enough food for the masses.

But it is extremely difficult to explain this point to the Chinese who has little knowledge of European culture. The remains of primitive democracy disappeared in China as far back as the 5th century B.C. and since then there has never

developed a struggle for freedom, such as has become part of the progressive European.

The Chinese were inspired by many fine ideas but not freedom. There were the ideals of humanness, duty and harmony, but there was no ideal of freedom.

The people who formed Mao Tse-tung's guerrilla armies were, at the best, bearers of the traditional Confucian erudition, in other words, bearers of the ideology of oriental despotism. The "communism" they learned, acquired quite logically the nature of the "communism" of Mo Ti (5th-4th cent. B.C.) and Wang Mang (1st cent. A.D.). That was a military barracks "communism," a "communism" established by "wise leaders" over humble and obedient people. No wonder therefore that Mao Tse-tung's reforms developed in about the same manner as those of Wang Mang: at first, when the main thing was to prepare the ground for the leap—within the limits of common sense; later when the leap itself was commencing—a forced economic development and a forced pushing of people.

The Chinese leaders' activities were progressive between 1949 and 1956. But even then there was no socialist democracy to be observed (even in the Party). Lenin wrote, however: "Socialism is impossible without democracy because: (1) the proletariat cannot perform the socialist revolution unless it prepares for it by the struggle for democracy; (2) victorious socialism cannot consolidate its victory and bring humanity to the withering away of the state without implementing full democracy." (*Coll. Works*, Vol. 23, p. 74)

Where despotism exists a leader is likely to

come who will ignore the national interests. When the will of one has the force of law, when the country has been transformed into an experimental laboratory, despotism develops into national tragedy.

Alienation of the Intellectuals

When discussing the proletarian revolution, proletarian party and dictatorship of the proletariat it is of crucial importance to recall Lenin's definition of the Marxist movement as a bloc of revolutionary intellectuals and conscious proletarians. Marxism without intellectuals is Marxism without Marx or Lenin.

A socialist movement supported by peasants (for lack of proletarians) is quite possible, and a number of such movements have won in Asian and African countries during the last few decades. A most vivid example has been furnished by the Mongolian People's Republic.

But the final victory of such movements largely depends on the strength of their union with the international working class and the world socialist system. Once this union breaks up the success of the movement becomes doubtful (at least for the time being). The weakness of the intellectual-and-peasant union is not only in the absence of organized proletarians but also in the lack of intellectuals themselves. In some countries the number of intellectuals is hardly a few score. In such circumstances democratic public opinion remains a vain dream. It is only an intelligentsia consisting

of creative workers with a genuinely free socialist press at its disposal that can create the mechanism of criticism and self-criticism and call attention to the leadership's mistakes in time.

No such tradition has developed in China. Under the persecution of Chiang Kai-shek in 1927 the communist movement was forced to retreat to the villages—it would have been crushed otherwise. But having left the towns the communist movement had its ties with the proletariat and particularly with the intelligentsia, weakened. This factor was conducive in making the Chinese Communist Party a version of the traditional Chinese government with Mao Tse-tung as its victorious peasant leader. The leader could at times be reprimanded by the members of such a government (in ancient times the Confucian officials found courage to do so). But the idea of blackballing Mao Tse-tung ever since 1935 has been as ridiculous as say, of "reelecting" the elective emperor of Byzantine, who became an autocrat the minute he mounted the throne. Undoubtedly, the old Chinese concept of the "mandate of heaven" automatically making the victorious claimant to the throne "son of heaven" has a bearing on this fact.

On becoming the leader of the peasant war Mao Tse-tung also became the focus of age-old monarchical aspirations. The more those aspirations developed, the further Mao Tse-tung drifted away from the urbanized, "westernized" intellectual sections of China's population.

This situation underwent a slight change when a united anti-Japanese front was set up at the end of the 30's. Formally cooperation was establi-

shed between the Communist Party and the whole of the Kuomintang. But actually it involved the opposition sections of the Kuomintang and other organizations containing progressive intellectuals. Cooperation with the Lefts lasted through the civil war of 1946-1949, and after the victory till 1956.

The developments following the 20th CPSU Congress in 1956 and the consolidation of the Soviet Union's prestige stirred Mao Tse-tung into action. Possessed with the idea of world leadership even then, he tried for a short while to pose as a "liberal Communist" accepting criticism of the Party leadership, supporting freedom of discussion and freedom of political opinion. In 1956 the experiment of "a hundred flowers" was conducted and in May 1957, the campaign "to rectify the Party's style in work" was launched. Intellectuals were asked to voice criticism in Party newspapers and magazines. Quite a lot of businesslike, interesting articles were published. Six weeks later an explanation, unparalleled in cynicism, was issued: the motto "may a hundred flowers bloom" was a hoax—"in order to behead the hydra it was necessary to lure it from its lair." The intellectuals that had been "lured out of their lairs" were compelled to confess their ideological fallacy and their ties with the American intelligence service in a most humiliating form, after which they were sent to the village. The villagers were told: "Take a look at him. His hands are white. He has never worked. He hates you! Make him do some real work!" After that there was no guard and surveillance problem. The process of "reeducation of intellectu-

als" actually began in 1949. All through the years that followed the officials (now themselves victims of the red guards and red rebels) strictly followed their leader's instructions.

In this way criticism inside China was checked and friendly warnings from abroad were completely ignored. Mao Tse-tung set out to solve the problems of social development prompted by the desire to enhance his authority rather than by common sense. The "great leap forward" came as a result of his utter disregard for economic laws, and his making a fetish of the moral factor, or more precisely, of the force of ideological command. The social and economic programme based on a more or less realistic appraisal of facts which had been adopted at the 8th congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 1956 was dropped for what amounted to a mere utopia. The consequences were so catastrophic that Mao decided to stay away from economic management for the time being and only conducted ideological direction. The persecution of intellectuals continued and relations with other Communist Parties deteriorated.

A time came when the absolute-ruler psychology took the upper hand completely, a psychology that can be studied by numerous examples ever since the Han Emperor Chin Shih Huang Ti. An autocrat will not so easily admit a mistake he commits. If he repents one day he will eliminate the witnesses the next. The worse and more conspicuous the mistake the stronger his suspiciousness. In 1957 it was only the old non-Communist intellectuals that were under suspicion. Later Communist intellectuals were included in

the category—writers, philosophers, historians and critics. Then came the turn even of the tested Party cadres (recall the fate of Marshal Peng Teh-huai whom Mao removed as far back as 1959 for criticism of the “great leap forward” and “people’s communes”). But no wall can completely shut out the critical thought. Any person, even the most devoted and disciplined, can begin to have doubts. Even the absolute ruler himself secretly doubts his righteousness. This is why he does not believe anyone (save perhaps the flatterers who look at him with utter devotion and are ready to echo anything he says proclaiming it the word of genius in advance. But then even they are not safe). The ruler feels an urge to “crack” any thinking head. And the Party cadres who helped Mao handle his opponents for a number of years, have themselves fallen victims to his suspiciousness. In the final analysis the terror against intellectuals has critically weakened the regime. The less freedom of criticism the more mistakes; the more mistakes the stronger the suspiciousness and fear of exposure, the stronger the desire to crush opposition. Practically no possibility of criticism exists, hence the probability of subjective mistakes mounts immeasurably. A vicious circle emerges from which the autocrat sees only one way out—the setting up of a special administration to replace the one arousing suspicion. The administration of eunuchs during the Ming dynasty (14-17th centuries), the administration of oprichniks of Ivan the Terrible, the administration of red guards and red rebels of Mao Tse-tung. This is not a struggle against red tape as many Europeans naively believe taking up a

hint of Chinese propaganda. This is the crisis of a regime of absolute rule.

Traditional Factors Still at Work

The traditional features of the Chinese social structure are playing a prominent part in the present-day convulsions shaking the country. It goes without saying that they can be regarded as a particular case of the more general model of an underdeveloped country with survivals of pre-bourgeois social relationships. But such an approach may well prove wrong since many significant facts will then escape attention. Therefore it would be well to concentrate attention on the specific Chinese traits. Such an analysis will be limited to a certain degree but it will throw light on the factors that objectively interfere with China’s socialist construction. Yet it should not be assumed that these factors inevitably spell the failure of socialism in China. The deplorable fact is that a certain group is today working to halt the waning of these factors.

It is impossible to depict all the peculiarity of Chinese culture in just a few pages. We shall only deal with four of its aspects: Chinese humanism, Chinese rationalism, Chinese democratism and Chinese internationalism.

Chinese humanism. Chinese culture is the least religious of all, Confucianism which has had a tremendous impact on the country’s entire history was a moral and ethical philosophy rather than a religious one. When a pupil asked Confucius how the spirits should be served he said: “We

don't know how to serve people, how should we know how to serve spirits?" Man stands in the centre of the Confucian outlook. No God, spirit or any other holy being distracts from service to man. But the Confucian is never independent. Invariably he is only a cell in the family and state body, a "bound particle" of a huge molecule. The Confucian consciousness accepts the concept of man as a multitude of social relationships but it is absolutely incapable of perceiving "the everlasting development of the wealth of human nature as an end-in-itself" (Marx). One of Confucius's dialogues with his pupil illustrates this point.

"What are the conditions of good administration (i.e. prosperity)?" the pupil asked. "The people should be well-fed," said Confucius, "there should be a strong army; the people should trust the government." "Which of the three is the easiest to spare?" the pupil continued. "The army," Confucius replied. "And of the remaining two?" "I would prefer to do without food. From time immemorial people have died but without trust in the ruler the state will collapse."

A European humanist would probably reply that he would prefer that there should be no trust in the government. For him (theoretically at least) society is a multitude of individuals each of whom has an inviolable right to life and happiness. But the Chinese humanist even in theory believes that the state is an organism that enjoys the full right to sacrifice any number of its cells—people.

Chinese humanism in private life is just as peculiar. *Jen* (humanism) is often defined as love.

But it is not an independent individual's love based on free choice. It is the love of children for their parents, of a younger brother for his elder brother, of a wife for her husband, etc. This is love within the family (likewise within the state which is perceived as a great family). Apart from family love there is also friendship. But never have relationships based on free choice been made the centre of life in China. There is not a single canon in China that would say: a man shall leave his father and mother and shall be joined unto his wife (this is blasphemy and immoral from the Chinese point of view). No Chinese bard has lauded a Chinese Francesca da Rimini who broke her matrimonial duty or a Chinese Juliet who betrayed her parents for the sake of her beloved. Chinese humanism has never acknowledged the right of the individual to do as he pleases with his life. Confucius proclaimed the right of the individual to develop his intellect and his feelings, but never to act on his own free will. A man was *obliged* to love his father, older brother and sovereign. For this he expected that his children and subordinates would be *obliged* to love him. The European consciousness emphasizes the connection between love and freedom, the Chinese, the connection between love and duty.

Chinese rationalism. One often hears about the exceptional rationalism of the Chinese. This is very close to the truth. Never have religions based on belief in the bliss of the life beyond been popular in China. Many Chinese believed in spirits but not in immortality beyond, and if they asked the spirits to give them immortality, it was

immortality in this world. One emperor even died before his time because he had been drinking too much of an elixir of life prepared for him by some Tao quacks.

Mass religions in China have always been chiliastic, i.e. based on belief in the kingdom of heaven on earth. Thus they were half-religious, half-utopian. In a simplified way, it can be asserted that Chinese consciousness is not religious but utopian. It is based on the dream of a kind rule (as in the times of the legendary emperors Yao and Shun). Since in reality the emperors never spared the people, there always appeared a leader ready to "raise his fist in the name of harmony and justice." Such was the psychological background of countless Chinese uprisings.

Nonetheless, it is not to be concluded that the traditional Chinese consciousness is close to the European. Chinese rationalism has nothing in common with the European. The European consciousness perceives rationalism and individualism as very close in meaning, almost identical, whereas the Chinese sees them almost as antonyms. In Chinese history it was not individual but "swarm" consciousness (to use Leo Tolstoy's expression) that acquired a rationalist form. Individualism was expressed only in Buddhism, a mystical teaching imported from India. The social functions of Chinese rationalism and mysticism are the opposite of those in Europe. In the prime of its time Chinese Buddhism was individualist, eccentric and bohemian in style. Meanwhile Chinese rationalism had always been of a formal, official character and was actually an expression of collective, "apparatus" consciousness.

Two forms of rationalism have existed since ancient times: Confucian and legitimistic ("legitimism"—the Latin equivalent of the Chinese "fa-chia," school of state laws). Confucianism drew on conservative family humanism described above, and legitimism, on anti-humanist, administrative "zeal" (even by Chinese standards). Confucianism was based on the family and family ethics; legitimism rested on the more aggressive forms of class states, whose practices the legitimists wanted to develop into a system and law. They considered the family and family ethics hindrances just as any development of individual—intellectual, aesthetic or moral. Shang Yang, the ideologist of legitimism, regarded love for one's neighbour, self-improvement, arts, science or any spiritual interests as "worms eating away at the state," for they all threatened absolute submission to the sovereign and his ministers and also threatened the useful occupations of farming and welfare. According to legitimists man is very seldom born kind—this is something not to be hoped for. So he must be trained as an animal. Han Fei, a follower of Shang Yang, compared the subordinate to a piece of wood in the hands of the craftsman (this idea has a different wording today: "Human consciousness should be a blank to be filled in with any hieroglyphs"—Mao Tse-tung). Just as the craftsman who can make a wheel or an arrow by bending or straightening a piece of wood, the sovereign can make diligent farmers or fierce soldiers out of his subjects.

At tranquil periods of Chinese history Confucianism triumphed and spread its conservative, patriarchal humanism, while a few mystical tea-

chings existed in the background. But when social changes were imminent, legitimism (or something like it) became the only alternative.

The Chinese tradition is such that any group that isolates itself from the state and takes its own path, is considered a conspiracy and suppressed. For that reason the progressive minority cannot risk an experiment in hope that others will follow it if successful. The minority that wishes a renewed system must seize power and impose its will on the majority by force.

If Tolstoy's metaphor is to be used once more China can be described as a highly-organised swarm that remains quiet as long as it stays in its old hive. Once the time to change comes the swarm becomes highly agitated and is ready to fall on any passer-by and sting him half to death without any special reason.

No ideology based on display of personal initiative has taken root in China. Marxism, proclaiming the individual's striving for freedom, could not be fully understood there either. The new times and new culture had barely touched only a few coastal towns on the brink of the 20th century. Marxist criticism of bourgeois individualism taken up by the Chinese consciousness which had not fully grasped even the idea of bourgeois individualism revived certain forms of pre-bourgeois thinking (in one of its least attractive shapes). Semi-Confucian China was modified into a legitimistic China. The spirit of Shang Yang, Han Fei and Chin Shih Huang Ti was resurrected.

Of late years all the monsters of Chinese history have been called back to life, lauded and quot-

ed for the edification of the enfeebled bourgeois and petty-bourgeois humanists. It has become unnecessary to refer to Marx or Lenin—the domestic sources are doing finely. Besides it is also possible to issue new maxims in the same key. The logic of administrative fervour expressed in words itself becomes legitimistic. It is unlikely that Mao Tse-tung had Han Fei in mind when he compared the Chinese peasant to a clean sheet of paper on which any beautiful script could be written. Simply his way of thinking is the same, nor must one believe that the present leaders of the red guards deliberately copy Chin Shih Huang Ti and his prime minister Li Ssu when they burn books. It is a deplorable fact that in the past too Chinese civilization proved capable of advances only as a result of outbreaks of administrative fervour after which a long time was needed to make good the damage inflicted on culture.

Chinese democratism. Ever since the Tang dynasty (7-9th cent.) if not earlier, any peasant youth who passed the examinations for the post of official could formally become first minister. And if the circumstances were especially favourable he could even become emperor (as the founder of the Ming dynasty.) The Chinese are absolutely void of any aristocratic prejudices. But the absence of aristocratism still does not mean the presence of democracy. Chinese tradition lacks one significant feature—legal opposition. The Chinese cannot even conceive of opposition until he himself joins a conspiracy. A high-ranking official of the Ming period, Tso Kuang-tou, had accused a favourite eunuch of Emperor

Kuan-tsung of countless crimes and was tortured to death in prison. In his last letter to his sons, written after several weeks of daily torture, without a ray of hope of salvation, Tso Kuang-tou said: "I am in great pain and anguish but the only thing I deplore is that my blood-filled heart was unable to thank the emperor" (1625).

Two forms of political behaviour were known in old China: absolute loyalty and conspiracy. Actually the two were usually combined, since behind the screen of loyalty, a web of secret intrigues was often concealed. Consequently, when the people's patience wore thin they always found organizations that were ready to lead an uprising. There was no shortage of leaders either. Most often they were people who had failed to pass their examinations for government service or who had not completed their education. For ages such people had led numerous peasant movements, since they were capable of mustering some sort of organisation and knocking together a civil and military apparatus. As to their ideology, it was Confucian to some extent. Kung-tsi himself denounced loyalty to a tyrant (without specifying who was to be considered such). Meng-tsi, the second biggest authority of the Confucian school, recognized the people's right to rebel. Any religious, ethical or political doctrine that had been spread amidst the masses and understood chilianically by them could be a stimulus for an uprising. The Taipings of the 19th century were inspired by a poorly understood Christianity, the red guards of the 20th century, by Maoism.

Chinese internationalism. In a sense, the Chinese have always been internationalists, never a na-

tion in the European meaning, one that regards itself as something special existing alongside other nations. The Chinese believed they were a civilization (Celestial Empire or Middle Kingdom, i.e. centre of the world) surrounded by barbarians. The barbarians could become civilized, i.e. assimilate the Chinese civilization. In that case they would not become civilized Tibetans or civilized Vietnamese, but simply Chinese. The Chinese have always believed non-Chinese civilizations to be intermediary and imperfect. When China's throne was occupied by a militant dynasty, the neighbouring peoples were "helped" to become "real" people, like all other subjects of the son of heaven. This idea became so firmly rooted in Chinese heads that other peoples living in China in solid groups were granted the status of autonomous region (and not autonomous republic) after 1949 when the Chinese People's Republic was formed. The idea of equality of Tibetans or Uigurs is as ridiculous for the Chinese as, say, of the identity of Barbarism and Civilization. The fact that the Tibetans and Uigurs are peoples of a thousand-year history and culture is immaterial. The indisputable fact of ethnical individuality is as strange to the modern Chinese—descendants of numerous tribes swallowed up by the Middle Kingdom—as the absolute fact of the individual.

Scientific Socialism vs Maoism

The theory of scientific socialism is incompatible with the dogmas and doctrines assembled in the eclectic, superficial system of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" as it is referred to in China.

How are certain crucial problems posed and solved by the Marxist-Leninist teaching and by Maoism?

Scientific socialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin is based on recognition of the objective laws of social development. The idea of forcing the general course of history is absolutely alien to it as is the idea of deliberately aggravating the situation and jumping over whole stages of development in a mad race. The great role of revolutionary activity recognized by all Communists, must not degenerate into empty "revolutionism" or "militantism"—the terms Lenin used to describe petty-bourgeois verbiage.

The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" (like the motto "riot—the righteous cause") signify a complete departure from Marxist scientific doctrine and a slipping down to anarchism or other political trends close to it. Marxist revolutionaries have never regarded themselves as "revolutionary rioters" nor have they called for "extreme action" at any cost. Such ideas were only popular among the anarchist-decadent movements that wavered between revolution and reaction.

Many of Mao Tse-tung's mottoes like "spearhead—against spearhead," "policy—the commanding force," "the rifle brings power," etc., are a petty-bourgeois distortion of the theory of class struggle, reduced to the notorious "theory of violence." Unable to cope with the problems involved in the development of socialist economy in a petty-bourgeois medium Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues magnify the force of commands to fantastic proportions, i.e. apply military and administrative methods of running the economy

and culture. The tasks of socialist construction are identified with exertion of revolutionary will and the objective difficulties that cause failures are regarded as a result of malicious action by the opponents of the existing system.

Such is the source of the methods of compulsion and fear of any independent thinking and words. Since Mao Tse-tung cannot orientate in the complicated class relationships of modern China his pseudo-revolutionary policy has developed into the traditional state violence against the masses. The extreme elements make the most of the system of demagoguery and intimidation to achieve their dirty, careerist ends. Official policy itself, based as it is on fallacious principles, has no scruples over the means employed. It is characterized by the deliberate invention of myths, the staging of provocations, terror against Party cadres, unprincipled zigzagging, that is, methods which Marxists rejected even during the struggle against the anarchists in the First International.

The scientific socialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin is the culmination of preceding cultural development. The creators of scientific socialism took legitimate pride in the fact that their theory was not a spontaneous denial of civilization but a combination of the greatest scientific advances with the working-class movement. From the very outset Soviet Government policy convincingly demonstrated that Bolshevism was void of any nihilistic rejection of the classical heritage. Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the working class would not be able to build a new society without the aid of specialists. Even when many old intellectuals resisted the new system for fear of

the working masses and their being accustomed to the old way of life, the Soviet Government adopted laws that were imbued with respect for the intelligentsia and their work. When Lenin used the term "cultural revolution" he meant triumph over illiteracy and conquest of the heights of culture.

What today is referred to as "cultural revolution" in China is nothing but a denial of universal culture and destruction of the great values the Chinese people have created over the ages.

The scientific socialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin is permeated with the idea of continuous improvement of the sphere of production. While fighting the narrowness of bourgeois civilization the Communists have never suggested pushing the human race back to primitive forms of existence. They have not proposed universal and equal poverty, nor regarded material wealth as contrary to the revolutionary ideal.

The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" contain an entirely different conception of the transition to the communist way of life. According to this conception all differences among people should be eliminated in an ascetic fervour and all should be brought to a lower stage irrespective of the real development of production and in defiance of the people's material interests and conditions of life. The proclamation of universal and equal backwardness has become a prominent feature of Maoism: "The obvious feature of the 600-million people, apart from its other features, is its poverty and the fact that it is a clean sheet of paper. At first glance that seems bad, but actually it is only good. . . There is nothing but a clean sheet

of paper, it can be covered with the newest and most beautiful words or with the most beautiful pictures." The assertion that "the poorer the people, the more revolutionary they become" is meant to substantiate the special mission of Mao's China.

Plebeian ascetism was a peculiarity of the first popular uprisings in Europe and particularly, Asia. Suffice it to recall early Christians, their desire to eliminate wealth and their scorn of luxury, and the good things of life—a form of spontaneous protest against social injustice. To revive similar ideas in the 20th century is to depart from scientific socialism; to abolish class distinctions on such a basis cannot be progressive and can only result in stagnation and decline.

The scientific socialism of Marx, Engels and Lenin proclaims peace among nations not for tactical considerations but on the basis of profound principles. Setting itself the objective of a radical solution of social contradictions through economic development above all, this socialism needs no export of revolution, no engineering of coups or transition from revolution to war. Unlike the old bourgeois propaganda slander, Communists have always firmly adhered to this view, being aware of the fact that in any country it is only revolutionary enthusiasm of the masses and a revolutionary situation that can really develop into a socialist revolution. Any pushing of revolution from outside amounts to adventurism.

This is another point on which the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" make a clear break with scientific socialism. Inability to solve internal contradictions by means of elementary state com-

pulsion engenders adventurism on an international scale, which explains the demands that "the revolution should be completed" and the whole of the world "aroused;" hence the purely militarist formulas having nothing to do with real socialism: "a state always dies if it is not threatened by external forces," "we must base all our work on the probability of war." Even if Mao accepts the possibility of peaceful coexistence it is only as a tactical motto, temporary and relative. Meanwhile one of Mao's basic "thoughts" is that "war can be abolished only by war," that "it is necessary to fight war by means of war." Evidently Mao regards the whole world as a clean sheet of paper to be covered with anything that happens to cross his mind.

Actually the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" are not even original. They are a repetition of the stock sophisms of an anarchic and decadent type, known throughout the world like "poverty is better than wealth," "war is the road to peace," "primitive consciousness is better than culture," etc. Modern humanity is familiar with these formulas in their most reactionary shapes.

The "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" also break with Marxist materialism when they denounce the significance of the real interests of the masses and the material and technical requisites of social transformations. The remedy proposed in case of a lack of such requisites is exertion of the collective will. Finally, the very fact of idolization of Mao has little to do with Marx's materialism.

Much of Maoism could be explained by petty-bourgeois socialism of the peasant type. But it

would not be quite correct inasmuch as compared with the heritage of Sun Yat-sen whom Lenin considered a true carrier of peasant democracy; the "thoughts of Chairman Mao" signify a step back from democracy towards old Chinese traditions of military domineering, suppression of individuality, mutual surveillance, hypocrisy and toadyism. Chinese history provides abundant examples of similar government systems (ever since the Chin dynasty). The peculiarity of the modern pattern is the fact that the Mao clique has made its way to military despotism by means of various ultra-left, sectarian and dogmatic deviations, through noisy criticism of the alleged "revisionism" of other Communist Parties, through the proclamation of "irreconcilability" in the struggle against imperialism.

The outward "leftism" of this social demagoguery conceals a return to the most reactionary chauvinistic objectives including the spread of Mao rule to all the actual and imaginary possessions of the former "Celestial Empire." The Mao cult is a distortion of the Chinese people's natural patriotism, suppressed by imperialist states in the past. It also nourishes the idea of national exclusiveness and Chinese Messiahship, i.e. claim to leadership in Asia and throughout the world.

CHAPTER II

WHY DID MAO TSE-TUNG NEED TO "SEIZE POWER?"

It becomes increasingly obvious that the seizure of power which Mao Tse-tung has proclaimed for the maintenance of his position is leading

to the establishment of a military-bureaucratic dictatorship with all its inherent attributes, a dictatorship which is being established in the course of an actual counter-revolutionary overturn.

To understand why the motto "seizure of power" comes from a person who seems to have been enjoying full power one will have to recall the recent past and the few years in which the special Mao policy took final shape.

The Onset of the Party Split. First Victims

That the emergence of differences in Chinese society and the subsequent bitter political struggle was a result of the crisis of the CPC foreign and domestic policy is plain. In 1958 the Party leadership decided to sharply accelerate economic development by means of the "great leap forward." The nation was promised that "in three years of hard work it would gain happiness for ten thousand years to come." The consequences of the "great leap forward" are general knowledge. Colossal damage was inflicted on the national economy. Industrial output in 1962 was only half that in 1959 and the gross grain yield, two-thirds. Despite the fact that no statistical information is issued in China facts show that the economy is still in the process of recovering after the "great leap" policy. The drop in the production of a number of key industries and the deterioration of the working people's position it entails, still continue.

Mao Tse-tung's attempts to lay the blame on

natural calamities, treacherous external forces and the inability of local Party functionaries properly to implement Peking's directives have not deceived many. The conclusion to be drawn from information in the Chinese papers is that most Party workers had realized the true causes of economic failure, a fact that provided ground for mounting dissatisfaction with the policy conducted by the Chinese Communist Party leaders. The fallaciousness of this policy became even more obvious as the Party leaders were actually compelled to give up the "great leap," "small-scale steel industry," "people's communes" and other economic campaigns that were according to Mao to bring China to communism "ahead of schedule."

Chinese Communists were deeply shocked at Mao's rejection of friendship and cooperation with the Soviet Communist Party and other fraternal parties. It was hard for Chinese Communists to understand why the calls for "world revolution" did not prevent the leaders from considerably expanding China's economic and trade relations with the capitalist countries and breaking them off with the countries of socialism. It was likewise difficult to conceal China's political setbacks in Asia and Africa.

As the true meaning of the domestic and foreign policy became plain, dissatisfaction mounted among Communist Party members. Apparently the same sentiments were also to be observed in a certain section of the leadership, since despite the tremendous efforts by Chinese propaganda, it became increasingly difficult to see what was what. Party activists themselves often remarked

that "the grim days China is living through are a result of the leadership's erroneous ideas," that "the general line is faulty, the great leap has pushed China to the brink of an abyss and the village communes are a bitter lesson for the future."

A number of Party workers and economists came out for restoration of the cost accounting system, a more extensive use of commodity and money relations; they spoke of the necessity of a proper combination of material and moral stimuli of production. Concerned about the prospects of socialist construction, Communists often emphasized that a scientific approach was essential, and criticized the opinion that "the Chinese revolution could be led on the basis of subjectivist conceptions." It was primarily against these people that the current political campaign, called by its sponsors the "cultural revolution," was spearheaded.

The forerunners of today's fights were noticed in 1964, when the papers launched a vicious campaign against eminent scientists and writers who had directly or indirectly expressed their doubts about Mao Tse-tung's infallibility. The campaign was initiated by Mao himself, since he thought that a convenient moment had come to attack his ideological opponents. It was announced at the session of the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives at the end of 1964 that "it is necessary to reeducate the Chinese people and the entire Party" in the spirit of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung. And that was made the chief objective of the "cultural revolution."

Ever since then the struggle has gained mo-

mentum and expanded, spreading to all aspects of Chinese public affairs and involving more and more social groups and political forces.

This struggle can be broken down into several stages with every subsequent one differing from the preceding by greater bitterness and viciousness, by ever graver political charges against those opposing the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." Today regard for the "ideas of Mao" have been announced the criterion of citizens' political and ideological loyalty. According to *Jenminjihpao* this is what makes it really possible to determine "who is a true revolutionary and who a pseudo-revolutionary or a counter-revolutionary... At present and in the future whoever comes out against the ideas of Mao Tse-tung becomes a mortal enemy of the revolution, a mortal enemy of the people."

Workers in literature, the theatre, the cinema and fine arts—workers in the entire ideological sphere—fell the first victims of the purge. Papers and magazines poured criticism on merited cultural leaders, Chinese Communist Party members and non-Party people, who for decades had devoted their talent to the cause of the revolution. Mao Tung, writer of world fame, was removed from the post of Minister of Culture. The same lot befell his assistants and the leaders of a dozen writers, composers, and film workers unions and the like. Between 1964 and 1966 nearly all of the elite of Chinese intelligentsia were proclaimed unreliable. Reprisals followed first in the form of removal from official posts and expulsion to the villages and then in the form of physical violence.

Those people were mainly "guilty" of opposition to the doctrines of Mao Tse-tung and to the policy of breaking off friendly relations with the Soviet Union. As *Jenminjihpao* stated in February 1966, one hundred and sixty thousand intellectuals had been sent to the country for "physical reeducation" over a period of one and a half years. The red guards' papers, citing a high-ranking official, announced that another 400 thousand "elements hostile to Mao Tse-tung" and their families had been sent to out-of-the-way parts of the country since the beginning of the "cultural revolution." In this way the leadership group deliberately (and efficiently) removed from public affairs a whole section of the more politically conscious people, loyal to the ideas of socialism.

The reprisals against artistic and literary workers were accompanied by a campaign against classical Chinese literature, poetry and theatre. Hundreds of articles were published to discredit the most popular and always favourite works of literature and the arts, chiefly because they were imbued with humanist and freedom-loving ideas. Similar "charges" were levelled against world literature and the arts.

Although up till the end of 1965 the political and ideological campaigns involved numerous sections of the population, they still were mainly directed against individuals.

The "Cultural Revolution" Gains Scope

In November 1965, on Mao Tse-tung's personal instructions the "cultural revolution" began

to unfold as a large-scale political, organizational and ideological purge of the Party bodies and state educational, cultural and propaganda institutions.

It was no accident that the purge began at exactly that time. At the end of 1965 the bankruptcy and utterly negative results of the "world policy" of the Party Central Committee deeply aggravated the differences among Mao Tse-tung's closest colleagues and possible successors. At the same time discontent grew in the midst of Party and government workers at all levels, even in central bodies. Consequently the CPC leadership were faced with the dilemma: either boldly to revise the policy and ideological directives of the last few years and make proper corrections that would definitely shatter the myth of Mao's infallibility, or to proceed with the special course (which would be impossible without a radical purge in the Party and state bodies).

Mao preferred the second line of action. Although we are not familiar with all the important details of the developments of those days, we can still state that at the end of 1965 a situation developed in China in which a small group headed by Mao openly set itself up against the people and Party and the majority of politically and ideologically mature party workers and resolved to continue leading the nation along a profoundly erroneous and adventurous path in defiance of the people's will and the national interests.

But from now on the Mao group could not rely on the Party and propaganda apparatus that it had. Therefore the army became the chief if not

the only instrument in the implementation of Mao's schemes. Since then the army's role in the country's political and ideological affairs has been enhanced immeasurably. The purge of the command of the People's Liberation Army conducted in 1959 after the removal of Marshal Peng Te-huai and the inculcation of the troops with proper Maoist spirit were also resultative.

It is no wonder therefore, that the army papers, particularly *Tsehsangchunpao* (the Army Daily) assumed the part of leaders and executors of the "cultural revolution." From November 1965, *Tsehsangchunpao* began publishing articles containing grave charges against those who had allegedly "come out against socialism," "defended right-wing opportunists," etc. (one of the first to be accused of that was Wu Han, former Deputy Mayor of Peking, historian and playwright).

Still, even in April 1966, it was possible to come across statements in Chinese papers that reflected differences of opinion in the leadership and in the Party Central Committee.

In February 1966, the Central Committee approved the theses drawn up by Peng Chen and Lu Ting-yi, containing the following stipulations: "All people are equal before the truth; matters should not be settled by force and people should not be suppressed by force," "one must be careful and discreet," etc.

The Party workers and intellectuals, who were used to the Aesopian language of Chinese newspapers, saw in this a good reason to believe that they were no longer to absolutize Mao's motto "policy—the commanding force" but pay more

attention to the solution of practical economic and cultural problems.

That period—from the beginning of 1966 till May—was the most confused. At present attempts are made to make people believe that Liu Shao-chi, Peng Chen and others intended to sabotage Mao's directives and weaken his position.

A sweeping change in the tone of the entire Chinese propaganda came in April when Mao and his supporters decided they had attained decisive superiority in the correlation of forces. The papers launched a campaign of intimidation alleging the possibility of the "restoration of capitalism," a "palace revolution," "repetition of the Hungarian events," "restoration of the monarchy" and "degeneration in the spirit of modern revisionism." At the same time *Tsehsangchunpao* started preaching fanatical loyalty to the ideas of Mao. Magnified to absurdity as it was, the leader's cult spread beyond all conceivable limits and turned into something like the religious worship of an idol.

The national and provincial newspapers let loose a downpour of damnations and threats against the "enemies of Mao's ideas"—"We shall trample them," "wipe them off the face of the earth," "grind them to dust," "destroy authorities with sticks."

The Chinese press asserts that the propaganda storm that has been shaking the country for two years now was actually caused by the fact that there was a "handful of counter-revolutionaries," and a "group of anti-Party and anti-socialist elements bestowed with power," headed by Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. Although at that

stage (April-May) the main attacks were directed against the Peking Party Committee, Peking newspapers and the Party organization of Peking University, it was clear even then that the fire was directed at the entire Party and nation.

The analysis of the information on hand shows that the chief accusations and their variations cropping up in the course of the "cultural revolution" boil down to the following: criticism of the "three red banners" (the "great leap forward," "people's communes" and "general line"), criticism of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" and disagreement with the policy of splitting the world communist movement and breaking off relations with the Soviet Union.

More and more "enemies" were announced—Secretary of the Peking Party Committee Teng To (First Secretary and member of the Politbureau of the CC CPC, Peng Chen, was removed from his post on June 2, 1966), Vice-Director of the Propaganda Department of the CC CPC Chou Yang, Professor Li Ta, member of the Communist Party of China from its foundation, and many others.

The ideological opponents of Mao Tse-tung were now labelled "enemies of the people," "traitors to the revolution," "bandits," "scum," etc.

The Peking Party Committee was dissolved and a new leadership appointed in violation of the CPC Rules. The Party committees at the country's biggest higher educational institutions and state organizations were smashed in the same way.

11th CC CPC Plenum. The Red Guards Rampant in the Streets

The 11th plenum of the CPC Central Committee played a special part in implementing the Mao policy. It actually sanctioned the new general Party line in home and foreign policy, i.e. settled questions that were strictly within the competence of the Party congresses.

The plenum documents are a concentrated expression of the adventurous and splitting policy pursued by China's leaders. They demonstrate complete rejection of the CPC Rules, the decisions of the 8th Congress and the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic. They also show that the Mao group has abandoned the Marxist-Leninist doctrine and deserted the communist movement and the socialist community.

As far as the national economy was concerned the Mao group attempted to force on it an utterly erroneous, unsubstantiated policy, the implementation of which would be accompanied by the further militarization of the entire life, bringing it as close to semi-military conditions as possible.

The plenum resolutions also meant a still greater "tightening of the screws" in all spheres of Chinese public affairs, expressed in the "four purges" formula (political, ideological, organizational and economic) in town and country. The first three "purges" actually constituted the purport of the so-called cultural revolution.

Along with administrative reprisals and suppression of all doubters, the Mao programme required a basic reeducation of enormous numbers

of people. This has been carried out during the last few years in the form of the "movement for socialist reeducation," which in reality has nothing to do with the process of instilling a genuinely socialist world outlook in the people.

The 11th plenum resolutions, adopted on the eve of the 17th anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic, actually seal the Mao group's departure from Marxism-Leninism, replacing it by the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" who has "brilliantly, creatively and comprehensively inherited, safeguarded and developed Marxism-Leninism and elevated it to a higher stage." The Chinese people are obliged to study the works of "the greatest Marxist-Leninist of our time." In reality this means the cramming of a number of primitive propositions—an assortment of dogmas intended to turn the Chinese into "stainless steel screws of Chairman Mao," ready unwaveringly to carry out anything Chairman Mao or anyone else acting on his behalf, happens to order. It is clear from the plenum documents that Mao Tse-tung's supporters consider the "reeducation of the people" a most important ideological instrument in achieving their ends in home and foreign policy.

One of the most important elements making up what today is referred to as the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" is the inculcation of hatred for the Soviet Union and the raising of a psychological barrier to any rapprochement with the Soviet Union not only in the life-span of the present generation but also in the future.

The 11th plenum documents are an accumulation of anti-Soviet slander. They contain all the

theses of Chinese propaganda as set forth by *Jenminjhpao* and *Hungchi*. The organizers of the plenum stated outright that Mao Tse-tung himself was the instigator of the present-day anti-Soviet, adventurous policies. The communique pointed out that all the so-called programme documents had been "drawn up under Mao Tse-tung's personal guidance."

Dissatisfied with the results of the "purge" of the first few months, the Mao group decided to introduce new methods of struggle against their real and imaginary opponents in June 1966.

On June 13, the Party Central Committee and the State Council adopted a resolution on a reform in the system of education, the abolition of examinations and postponement of enrolment at higher educational institutions. Studies were stopped for an indefinite period (calls for resumption were first uttered only eight months later). The main idea of the resolution was to replace education by study of the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." What it meant in reality was that the masses of young people, free of studies, were to become the leading force in the "cultural revolution."

The leadership picked the youth since politically they are the least mature and least experienced social group (as a matter of fact, most students and schoolchildren in China come from the non-proletarian sections of the urban population). The views of those teenagers (the participants in the "movement" are between 15 and 20 years old) were formed at the peak of the Mao cult, during the years of the sharp deterioration of Soviet-Chinese relations.

Mobs of raving youths and schoolchildren broke onto the scene, opening one of the grimmest pages in China's history. In their desire to terrorize, humiliate, morally or even physically manhandle their opponents the Mao group sanctioned mass riot in the capital and the provinces, which soon developed into mass beatings, scoffing at and murder of Mao's opponents, destruction of the cultural heritage and violation of law and order.

What went on in China between June and December 1966 resembled the medieval persecution of heretics by religious fanatics. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues are fully responsible for the outrages since they directed the youth detachments from the very beginning.

That the pogroms were carefully planned is obvious even from the fact that the red guards displayed utter "disregard" for the Chinese bourgeoisie, that they did not dare include the technical intelligentsia in their "sphere of action," whereas workers in the arts and Party workers were actually turned over to the mobs. Besides, the red guards had means of transport at their disposal, printing shops, and stocks of paper; they were fed and looked after by state organizations. On top of that the red guards were guided by the army, state security bodies and the so-called cultural revolution group in the CC CPC.

On September 15, 1966, Lin Piao spoke at a meeting in Peking and referred to the red guards as the "best sons and daughters of the Chinese people." He declared: "You are fully supported by Chairman Mao and the Party Central Committee... You are acting correctly and well."

Mounting Opposition

At the end of 1966 the red guards chose the Party committees at all levels as the chief object of their "activities"—vicious attacks, raids, pogroms and beating up of leading and rank-and-file Communists.

The "activities" were the direct result of Mao's motto "open fire at the headquarters," supported by the resolutions of the August plenum of the CC CPC, which had practically replaced Party and state bodies by "revolutionary committees"—the chosen vehicle of a "new revolutionary order," to be imposed on the nation.

In this way the major conclusion to be drawn from the Chinese upheaval is the fact that the Mao group has launched an offensive against its own Party and dedicated Communists and sanctioned the destruction of Party organizations and state bodies, in fact attempting to carry out a counter-revolutionary coup.

The political struggles reached their climax during the first few months of 1967. The turmoil heightened particularly after the working people had joined in. Up till the end of 1966 the Mao group managed to keep them away from the "cultural revolution," having good reason to fear that the workers and peasants could upset their apple cart.

In January and February fresh proof came that the forces of opposition were mobilizing. Even the confused and distorted reports by Chinese newspapers made it obvious that the opposition had been joined by part of the workers in the biggest cities—Shanghai, Canton, Tientsin

and others. Many Party and state leaders and rank-and-file Communists, and moreover, masses of non-Party factory and office workers and even some of the military refused to reconcile themselves to the notorious "cultural revolution."

It must be borne in mind that during the second half of 1966 the Mao group dealt a heavy blow at the leading Party, trade-union and Young Communist League bodies. The overwhelming majority of provincial and city Party committees were attacked. Most Party leaders of the provinces and big autonomous regions were accused of "suppression of the cultural revolution" and betrayal of the "ideas of Chairman Mao." Thus Mao Tse-tung managed to do away with a sufficient number of his opponents in the Party Central Committee. Over half the members and candidate members of the Central Committee elected at the 8th Congress were removed from their posts and barred from active participation in Party and state affairs.

Nevertheless the people who were opposed to Mao Tse-tung's policy were able to organize effective resistance to the "cultural revolution."

The bloody clashes in Shanghai, Nanking, Canton and Kweisui proved that the Party committees defending the gains of the socialist revolution in towns and provinces were a real force, supported as they were by workers who had, apparently, realized the danger the "cultural revolution" constituted for the working people and the nation.

The Mao group's intention to impose a barack-like regime on the people, freeze the low standard of living for a long time to come and

shape the working people into mute "screws" that were not even to dare think of a better life (and all this behind a smoke-screen of pseudo-revolutionary demagoguery) outraged part of the masses. The Chinese workers could no longer accept the idea of a beggarly existence, a kind of "cave socialism," the model of which Mao Tse-tung had attempted to establish at some enterprises, at Taching oil fields, for one.

The working class of China could not remain indifferent to the events developing before their eyes. Workers at a number of big plants and factories went on strike, disorganization set in on the railways, work was stopped at several big ports and many workers quit their jobs at plants. It was clear that a sizable part of the working class supported the managing staff of some enterprises and the Party functionaries who realized the importance of industrial production for the country's future, who realized that unless a tolerable standard of living was attained China's further advance and even the preservation of her present-day economic potential would be impossible.

The clashes between the red guards and workers in Shanghai, Harbin and Nanking, the tragic developments in Sinkiang and other regions vividly demonstrated that Mao's policy was encountering increasing resistance.

The peasants too were becoming less hesitant in expressing discontent over the "cultural revolution" and its interference in agriculture, and over the introduction of strict measures limiting sales at the free market.

A tense situation arose in the national provin-

ces—Sinkiang, Tibet and Inner Mongolia, where grapes of indignation at Mao's policy of assimilation had been ripening for a number of years. The situation became even graver as a result of the red guards mocking the religious feelings of Tibetan Buddhists and Sinkiang Moslems, their defacing of temples and mosques and insolent meddling in people's private life.

As a matter of fact, according to numerous reports of foreign agencies and red guards' papers, the PLA garrisons and their commanders stationed in those regions, too, came out against the "cultural revolution."

Stake on the Army. The Counter-Revolutionary "Seizure of Power"

Finally tensions ran so high that Mao decided to play his last card—the army—which he announced to be the "support of the dictatorship of the proletariat." There is no denying the fact, however, that "the dictatorship of the proletariat" in Peking style is the dictatorship of Mao and his yes-men, that he is out to impose a regime of absolute rule, one not supported by the people and Party, but relying on his personal "body-guards" and a military and police force.

Consequently, the army which was supposed to be an instrument for the defence of revolutionary gains from external encroachment, gradually developed into a bureaucratic police force, whose major occupation was to suppress the resistance that workers, peasants and intellectuals offered to the adventurous Mao policy.

Is there any other explanation for the fact that military units, many thousand strong, have flooded the towns, marching through silent and anxious crowds? What is the meaning of guns in the streets, armed patrols and sub-machine gunners at the entrances of state institutions? Has the entire war machine been alerted only to throw a scare into a "handful of counter-revolutionaries" and "seize power" from them? The absurdity of this claim is obvious. Naturally it is hard for the Mao group to admit that it is in the minority with its policy of opposing selfish interests to the interests of the nation. This is why army patrols and loaded guns "decorate" what used to be peaceful towns and now looks more like foreign-occupied territory.

Nor is that all. The army is not only suppressing resistance, removing and driving away the leaders of constituted bodies and Party organizations. Today the army has representatives in all the new government bodies, and enjoys control over political and public affairs. This is further proof that the "cultural revolution" has nothing to do with socialism or the dictatorship of the proletariat.

It is obvious that it is not the red guards or red rebels who play first fiddle in all the so-called revolutionary committees but the military. Those who still doubt the meaning of the current convulsion should take a closer look at what is going on in China at the present moment. Schools have reopened and part of the "little pioneers of the revolution" have been put away where they came from and the military have taken over the schooling. As far as industrial enterprises and trans-

port are concerned, the military have gone further than merely establishing a barrack-like regime—they actually control and direct production. Something like that is also happening in rural areas—military units are being sent to the villages to make the peasants do the sowing. Military dominance makes itself felt in the ideological sphere. The occupation of radio stations and newspaper offices shows that the propaganda machine is also in the hands of the army in the regions where the Mao supporters hold key positions. Such are the facts reported by the Chinese press itself. They give an idea of how the socialist government bodies are being suppressed, and a military-bureaucratic dictatorship imposed, and how overall militarization is proceeding. Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues intend to carry on their anti-socialist policy which will only bring more suffering for the people.

Mao Tse-tung Cornered

A fresh tide of red guards' demonstrations swept China in July and August 1967. Why were the mobs of red rebels and red guards let loose once more? Why the hunger strikes, unique in a socialist country?

Mao Tse-tung needed the recent mass campaigns organized by the Peking leadership in order completely to undermine the position of the part of the CPC leadership that was still stubbornly refusing to accept his policy. The huge demonstrations and the ravings of the red rebels and red guards pointed only to one fact: the si-

tuation was still confused, the position of the Mao group was far from being as strong as it would like it to be, and the ends of the "cultural revolution" were still to be achieved.

Political observers who are closely watching Chinese developments believe that this new campaign is to be explained by the fact that the influence of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping is so powerful that it has been impossible to eliminate or even weaken it. Secondly, Liu Shao-chi still refuses to admit the mistakes and crimes that are being ascribed to him. (If one is to believe Liu Shao-chi's accusers, it turns out that he deliberately entered the Chinese Communist Party in 1921 in order to restore capitalism in China after the victory of the socialist revolution). Another thing that has become clear is that the unity of three forces (the army, red guards and red rebels, as well as those Party functionaries who have declared their loyalty to Mao Tse-tung) about which the Peking propaganda-makers spoke so much and which was supposed to be the basis for the "seizure of power" has run up against insurmountable obstacles. Bloody clashes have been taking place between the red guards and red rebels, which not only threatens the doubtful idea of unity between the working masses and the red guards but civil peace in China in general.

The news coming out of China indicates that Mao Tse-tung's stake on the so-called revolutionary committees that were to replace the routed government bodies, have not brought much success either. And it was through these committees that Mao intended to undermine the position

of the Party committees and Party leaders that support Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping in one way or another, and oppose his policy. It has become obvious today that the "revolutionary committees" set up in several provinces have not justified themselves—fierce struggle is developing round them. In Heilungkiang Province there has even developed a movement called "Down with the new rule." This province is not an exclusion. Something of the same nature is developing in Kweichow where (according to Chinese papers) there are persons who are "openly and insolently instigating the overthrow of the provisional government bodies and seeking to attain a counter-revolutionary restoration." Who are those "counter-revolutionaries?" First of all they are people who will not reconcile themselves to the dissolution of the legitimate government bodies and Party organizations and who on legal grounds and in accordance with the Constitution are against the illegitimate bodies being set-up, and opposing the anti-Party activities by the Mao group.

But that is not all. Even in the "revolutionary committees" that have been set up, there is dissension and bitter fighting, particularly in Shensi Province and even the Peking committee. It was for good reason that *Jenminjihpao* published an item on the "threat of a counter-seizure of power in Shanghai" in July, Shanghai which was to become a model to be followed in the setting up of institutions to replace the elective government bodies. *Jenminjihpao* admitted that the "revolutionary committee" of Shanghai was made up of "inexperienced people who cannot retain po-

wer" and "that severe trials are still ahead." It was apparent that even the tested Maoists proved to be incapable not only of restoring normal life in the city but even of cooperating between themselves. On July 20, *Jenminjihpao* again called on the Shanghai Maoists to unite their ranks, forget their squabbles and devote all their strength to overthrowing Liu Shao-chi. Posters directed against the leaders of the Shanghai "revolutionary committee"—Chan Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan and others—went up. But it would be ridiculous to believe that these people who were brought to prominence by the tide of struggle against Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping now took their side.

The situation that has developed in other provinces is as unfavourable for the Mao group. Moreover, the setting up of the "revolutionary committees" has been halted in eleven provinces and Peking has resorted to its last measure—establishment of military control. The objective conclusion to be drawn from these facts is that a large part of the country and it may well be almost all of it, is coming out against the Maoists and their political course, and supporting those who realize (to some extent) the harm this policy is doing China.

The situation is even graver in the regions populated by national minorities—Sinkiang, Inner Mongolia, Tibet and the southern provinces where not only the Party organizations but also the masses are actively fighting against the chauvinistic, great-Han policy that Peking has been implementing particularly ruthlessly in the course of the "cultural revolution."

Finally Mao Tse-tung is finding opponents in what was to be his most reliable support—the army. Do these people support Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping? It is difficult to say. It is very likely that since these true Communists cannot accept the main principles of Mao's policy they find themselves included in the ranks of supporters of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping.

Another important factor in the political situation of the middle of 1967 is that a vicious struggle has been going on in the very midst of the red guards, red rebels and the so-called revolutionary organizations. It is a struggle for influence and sometimes an ideological struggle, since many people, including the youth, are changing their views in the course of the movement and coming to realize the monstrous absurdity of what they are called on to do.

It goes without saying that all these facts that are associated with the influence of Liu Shao-chi and his supporters basically change the picture of the victorious march of the "cultural revolution" that the Mao propaganda machine would like to present. But even this machine is powerless to conceal the fact that many of Mao's adventurist plans have failed. The current clashes, brawls, firing, increased hooliganism, stealing, banditism and speculation were obviously not a feature of the Mao group's plans. It is the inevitable consequence of the political chaos and anarchy that have sprung up as a result of Mao's calls to "open fire on Party headquarters," to "seize power," etc. Attempts to lay the blame for the grim consequences at the door of his opponents, particularly Liu Shao-chi, are not serious,

to say the least. It is absolutely clear that it was the "cultural revolution" that gave rise to the anarchy and chaos and caused a sharp drop in the people's standard of living.

Another rather unexpected turn for the Mao group is the fact that masses of people—tired of endless political campaigns, persecutions and disorder—have been seized with apathy and inertia. They are tired of the continuous noise and racket of the "cultural revolution" for two years now which has accompanied the struggle against Communists and all others who oppose Mao's directives.

The "threat of economism" has reappeared, being manifested, according to the Chinese papers, in people being dissatisfied with their low incomes, quitting their jobs "in search of a way out and demanding higher salaries and pay for overtime work." The papers also admit that the "revisionist scrap" has not been removed, i.e. the ideas of socialism that have been condemned as contrary to the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

A noteworthy fact is that the Mao group is trying to put a good face on the situation. That explains the talk that the "cultural revolution" will be repeated now and then in the future. Actually Mao's objectives have become much more modest than at the beginning of the campaign. He has been forced to give up the wildest of his mottos. But he is absolutely against giving up some of his objectives, one of the most important being the complete removal of Liu Shao-chi and his main supporters from the political scene. The second one for which Mao seems to be ready to fight for a long time yet, is the absolute domi-

nation of his ideas on the basis of a complete break with Marxism-Leninism.

This intention was vividly illustrated by the propaganda outbursts on the occasion of the 46th anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party (July 1, 1967). All news, articles and literature released for this occasion, were full of criticism of Liu Shao-chi and Teng Hsiao-ping. The same articles were permeated with the idea of knocking together a political organization that would replace the Chinese Communist Party (probably under the same name). This new organization would be guided by the spirit of absolute submission to the leader, laconically expressed in a phrase, monstrous to any Marxist and Communist—"If you understand Mao Tse-tung's instructions go and carry them out, if not, carry them out anyway."

But the recent developments point to the fact that there are people in China (and a good deal of them) who will not accept this interpretation of Party consciousness and Party discipline.

CHAPTER III

MAO TSE-TUNG'S DOMESTIC POLICY

It has always been obvious for any educated Marxist that socialist construction in China is an extremely difficult matter, China being a nation that has inherited age-old technical and economic backwardness, archaic social relationships in town, and still more so in the country, ignorance of the masses, exceptionally few intellectuals, to say nothing of scientists and technical spe-

cialists, and traditional isolation from the external world. The Chinese Communists were aware that while relying on general principles of development they would also have to search for new ways, forms and methods of transforming society. It was precisely for that reason that socialist construction in China aroused warm interest and was studied with close attention and was highly appreciated.

But China's domestic policy has undergone crucial changes during the last ten years, marked by the Mao group's drifting further and further away from the principles of scientific socialism and conducting a policy seriously damaging the cause of socialism and the working people's interests.

Compulsion—the Chief Lever of Economic Development

Mao Tse-tung's break with Marxism is most clearly manifested in his economic policy.

In 1958 Mao and his yes-men announced their adventurous intention to build communism in China in three years, fully ignoring the technical and economic level that had been achieved by then, as well as the objective laws of economic development. That was the so-called general line, the great leap forward, and the people's communes policy—a failure in every aspect. Taken aback by the tremendous economic difficulties caused by their policy, the Chinese leaders announced that the construction of the material and technical basis of socialism in China was a matter of the distant future. They not only gave

up the policy of raising the standard of living—one of the chief objectives of socialism—but even announced it to be “counter-revolutionary economicism.”

How can one accept the fact that people who call themselves Communists scorn the vital interests of the working people and doom them to a beggarly existence? In its anti-popular economic policy the Mao group has completely abandoned the Leninist principle of material incentive in industry and agriculture, which today has been labelled “a sword directed at the back of the proletarian revolution.” This principle was replaced by the directions “firmly to implement the rational system of low pay” and “to strive for high indicators in production and stick to a low standard of living.”

Lenin repeatedly emphasized that the economic condition of the masses and their economic interests stipulate their political sentiments. He maintained that it was the economic interests that “impel the masses of downtrodden, cowed, ignorant people to wage a great and unprecedentedly selfless struggle.”¹ “The masses are drawn into the movement, participate vigorously in it, value it highly and display heroism, self-sacrifice, perseverance and devotion to the great cause only if it makes for improving the economic condition of those who work.”² The experience of socialist and communist construction proves that the more tangibly the masses feel the fruits of economic transformations, the more

actively they participate in creative labour and revolutionary activities.

But the Chinese leaders make poverty a principle and try to prove that privations and hardships are inevitable for a long historical period and that it is for the sake of world revolution. Actually this is only a smoke-screen concealing their utter inability to ensure normal economic development.

Lenin emphasized more than once that after victory of the revolution the economy, the sphere of material life becomes the main battlefield in the struggle for socialism. The Mao system of views on the ways of social transformation is exactly the opposite of Lenin's idea. They are based on a subjective understanding of the moral factor and not on material conditions. According to Mao, once the Chinese people master his “ideas” all problems will become settled, the economic ones included. It is not in industrialization or the introduction of modern techniques in the national economy, not in mastering the wealth of world culture that Mao Tse-tung sees a road to socialism, but in an arbitrary planting and conservation of an isolated natural economy based on manual labour, primitive implements and domestic industry.

True, there is no denying the need of the extensive use of manual labour in Chinese conditions since the technical level is on the whole very low. Still this does not mean that a socialist country should direct its economic policy towards the preservation of existing conditions without mapping out realistic ways of overcoming technical and economic backwardness. But the

¹ *Lenin, Coll. Works, Vol. 11, p. 423.*

² *Ibid., Vol. 18, p. 85.*

Chinese economic policy of the last few years, particularly since the launching of the "cultural revolution," shows that the Mao group sees no such ways and is trying to find a solution in introduction of a labour system based on the principle that a man should be "at once a worker, a farmer and a soldier."

The meaning of this system is that while the workers are at plants, their families must work in the fields and help the workers at moments of "storm." The state not only relieves itself of the responsibility for supplying food, and building houses and public utilities (the workers themselves dig mud-houses or make primitive dwellings of earth and cane) but also wants to develop production without proper capital investments, through the sheer exhaustion of the workers' energy and with exceptionally low wages. This is what distinguishes the enterprises (the Taching oil fields for one) that the Chinese leaders present as a model "socialist enterprise of the Chinese type."

Similarly, a system is being imposed in the villages under which the farmers have not only to work in the fields but also in domestic industries and produce everything they need by themselves. And the Chinese officers and men are to alternate service duties with work in the fields and at shops.

There is another system introduced in a number of industries which cannot be ignored. It actually amounts to compulsory labour and consists in young farmers being sent to town to work at industrial enterprises for a term from three to seven years. These people who are taken away

from their families and given a miserly compensation for their work, are actually driven until they wear out. When they are exhausted they are replaced by "young farmers who have sound health." This method is becoming more and more widespread and is cynically considered a "regular infusion of fresh blood." The "theoretical basis" of this method is the "incompatibility of the system of permanent employees with the ideas of Mao Tse-tung."

All these facts—the setting up of an isolated natural economy; the conservation of manual labour, primitive implements and domestic industries; the compulsory expropriation of a considerable portion of the means of subsistence from the direct producers in town and country which results in an extremely low standard of living; the introduction of what amounts to compulsory labour and political disfranchisement—bring back the sombre features of the past, distort the principles of socialism beyond recognition and make China a caricature of socialist society.

The reactionary economic policy pursued by the Mao group practically removes the primary task facing any people who have embarked on the path of socialism—a planned and proportional development of the productive forces and a steady raising of the working people's living and cultural standards—thereby destroying all prospects of development.

Outward revolutionary fervour and the attempt to develop the economy by "great leaps" have made the Chinese leaders absolutely incapable of guiding economic progress.

Military Barracks—Mao Tse-tung's Ideal

The Maoists' departure from the principles of scientific socialism is fully as plain in the sphere of political organization. It stems from Mao's fallacious ideas with regard to the correlation between the economy and politics and the role of political leadership which is defined by his formula "policy—the commanding force," "policy commands everything."

Thus by attaching a dominant, self-sufficient significance to politics, Mao Tse-tung breaks it away from the objective economic basis, thereby obtaining the possibility of arbitrarily changing both its contents and methods of implementation.

Socialism cannot develop without the people's participation in political, state and public activities. Mao Tse-tung has replaced this absolute condition of socialist democracy by the bloody excesses of his "storm detachments"—the red guards and red rebels. Legal standards, socialist law and intra-Party democracy are being openly violated. The Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic has become a scrap of paper. All civil rights have been usurped from the people and they are no longer protected from victimization and atrocities. The China of today has not a single elective government body.

Democracy and legality are being replaced by the "army spirit" which is Mao Tse-tung's ideal of social organization. Workers, peasants and intellectuals are to become an "army without uniform." Militarization is spreading to all the as-

pects of life. The idea is still further to enhance the role of the army and make it an organization which will be responsible only to Mao Tse-tung and which will be outside popular and Party control. The army is being granted administrative and police functions in suppressing the workers' and farmers' opposition.

Militarization of the life of society (spiritual life included) is to help the leaders turn the entire Chinese people into blind executors of their will, completely isolate the working class from the influence of genuinely socialist ideology and culture by means of the "Mao-think" barrier. Instead of rearing well-educated and conscious builders of socialism Mao would like to turn the whole people into "docile buffaloes."

This policy is nothing but an outrage upon human dignity and rights. It blocks the Chinese people's political and cultural development and pushes the country further into backwardness.

The Mao policy in other spheres, in the solution of the nationalities problem for one, clearly indicates the departure from the basic principles of Marxism-Leninism.

"Friendship of Nations," Mao Style

The petty-bourgeois and chauvinistic character of the theory and practice of the Mao group and their concept of society and methods of its organization explain the current instability in policy and the wild darts from one extremity to another.

This has been manifested with special clarity in the approach to the problem of nationalities.¹

Among the peoples living in the northern provinces of China more prominent are the Uigurs (4 mln.), Dungans (4.3 mln.) who also live in many other regions of China, Manchus (2.8 mln.), Mongols (1.75 mln.), Koreans (1.35 mln.) and Kazakhs (0.6 mln.). Fifteen nationalities number from 185 thousand to only a few thousand.

The more numerous peoples living in the southern and south-western provinces are the Chuang (8.5 mln.), Yitsu (3 mln.) and Puyi (1.5 mln.). Seventeen nationalities number between one million and several score thousand. It is a remarkable fact that non-Chinese peoples inhabit over two-thirds of China's present territory.

This information is enough to demonstrate that the nationalities problem is exceptionally complicated and peculiar in China. The ethnical heterogeneity, language differences, peculiarities of natural and historical conditions in which each of these peoples developed, heightened by age-old social, economic and political oppression, formed the background of the general backwardness of China's national provinces. At the time People's China came into being only a few of the peoples had reached the stage of capitalist development and had a rich national culture, literature and art (for example the Uigurs). Tibet which actually

¹ The national composition of the CPR is as follows: the size of the population is 700 million, some 42-43 million of whom are non-Chinese nationalities, about 50 in all (this information is approximate since official statistics have not been published in China for many years).

is not closely connected with China, was ruled by a feudal-theocratic regime; some peoples did not have distinct class relationships, and many others were still at the early feudal stage with strong survivals of slave-ownership.

Another remarkable fact is that the Chinese themselves (Hantsu or Chungkuojen in Chinese) are heterogeneous. The differences between various groups of Chinese are most clearly seen in the language. The Chinese language has numerous dialects. The chief ones are the northern spoken by about 400 million people, Shanghai (50 mln.), Hunan (30 mln.) and Kwangtung spoken by 30 million. The difference between these dialects is so vast that people from different provinces absolutely do not understand each other.

Nevertheless even during the reign of the Manchu emperors, to say nothing of the last few decades of the Kuomintang regime, the myth was widely propagated that China had formed and existed as a state of a single nation from ancient times... Although it was admitted that apart from the Hans there also lived Manchus, Mongols, Tibetans and Dungans in China, it was alleged that all these peoples had the same forefathers, came from a single root and were akin to each other. The Kuomintang officials did their best to "prove" that the non-Chinese nationalities were just tribes and that they should be made Chinese. This theory which went as far as advancing the thesis of a "single state nation in China" was used by the Kuomintang as a basis for their policy of assimilation.

Such views are understandable as long as they

come from conservative, reactionary classes and from executors of great-power nationalistic policy. Naturally they have nothing in common with a Marxist-Leninist solution of the nationalities problem. Yet facts show that the Mao group are acting precisely as followers of the great-power and chauvinistic traditions, sanctifying assimilation of non-Chinese peoples by violence.

Chinese Communist Party documents of the early stage of the communist movement recognized nations' right to self-determination up to secession. In 1945 Mao Tse-tung wrote in the political report to the 7th CPC Congress (known as his work on "Coalition Government") that China granted its nationalities the right to self-determination and formation of a union with the Han people on a voluntary basis. But some time later this thesis disappeared from the Party resolutions. References to the existence of a "single Chinese nation" (compare with the Kuomintang "single state nation") began to crop up in Mao Tse-tung's works.

In 1949 the Marxist principle of nations' self-determination was replaced by a more limited principle of "regional autonomy." The 1954 Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic contained no mention of the right of nations to self-determination. The leadership even tried to prove that the Chinese way of solving the problem of nationalities was a Marxist one and had international significance. The principle of self-determination was pronounced a special case valid on Soviet territory. An attempt was even made to prove that Lenin accepted only the principle of national autonomy after the Revolution. That was

done (and is still being done) to justify the denial of the principle of nations' self-determination.

But still despite its inconsistency and lack of finality, the Chinese Constitution contained one democratic principle on the basis of which it was possible to solve the nationalities problem—the principle of equality of all nations.

Naturally the Chinese leaders are perfectly aware of the fact that the China of today has developed as a multi-national state and that many peoples, now inhabiting the country, had formed independent states and developed high culture before they were conquered by the Chinese emperors.

Despite their savagery the old rulers of China had almost all failed in "Chinazation" of the more numerous peoples. This is the objective that the Mao group has decided finally to achieve. That it is so is borne out by the way the principle of national autonomy has been implemented.

In 17 years numerous autonomous units (five regions and 93 autonomous districts and subdistricts) have been formed, and formed in such a way as to disintegrate the peoples. (For example in Chinghai Province there are 6 autonomous districts, in Szechwan, 3 autonomous districts—two of them Tibetan; and in Kweichow, 2 districts and 4 subdistricts etc.) Chinese territories are united with the national autonomous units in order to increase the percentage of the Chinese (this was done in Inner Mongolia which was joined with two Chinese provinces). Today the Chinese comprise at least half of the population of the national regions.

National representatives formally hold the

leading posts (and not all of them) in the government bodies of the autonomous territories while the actual working apparatus is made up of Chinese and clerical work is conducted in the Chinese language. With the exception of Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia, schooling and radio-broadcasting are conducted only in Chinese and only Chinese papers are published. Only Mao Tse-tung's works and political literature are published in the national languages.

Even smaller autonomous units set up in violation of the Constitution, scatter the national minorities and do not ensure national autonomy.

Even in cases where it is possible to unite a people in one autonomous unit, the process of national consolidation is deliberately halted. For example, the Tibetans who live in one compact group have been divided into 9 autonomous districts and one autonomous region. The same has been done to the Yitsu and Chuang. If the Chuang (the Puyi included) had been united within the borders of one autonomous unit they would have occupied a territory half as large as they do at present.

The situation that has arisen in the larger national regions—Tibet, Sinkiang and Inner Mongolia—is highly indicative of the Mao group's chauvinism. Until 1950 Tibet had practically retained its independence and a theocratic government. A preparatory committee to form the Tibet autonomous region was set up only in 1956. For six years after the March riot (1959) and the Dalai Lama's flight the Chinese leaders were still unable to complete preparations. It was only in 1965 that the formation of the Tibet Autonomous

Region was announced. The Chinese Government in Tibet relies on military force first and foremost. According to some reports up to 150 thousand Chinese soldiers are stationed in Tibet. Chinese settlers the number of whom has not been ascertained have also moved there. The Panchen Lama formally held his position in the All-China Assembly of People's Representatives till 1965. After 1959 the Chinese used the Panchen Lama as a screen. But apparently he was not so well liked in Peking either and at the end of 1964 he no longer was member of the Assembly and the government of the Tibet Autonomous Region. There has been no news of him for a long time now.

The "cultural revolution" ushered in even grimmer times for the Tibetans. The red guards found their way even into Tibet. After it had been announced that the Tibetans were allowed to possess only the bare necessities the red guards began to break into their homes to check the execution of this order. The guilty ones were first brought to trial and then paraded through the streets of Lhasa as a warning.

Even Ngabu Ngawan Jingme—Chairman of the Tibetan Government—was not spared. His house was raided and his wife was led through the city together with other prisoners. The Deputy Chairman of the Tibetan Committee of People's Political Consultative Council was summoned to court four times and savagely beaten up.

A fresh outrage upon the religious feelings of Tibetan believers was the closing down of the Buddhist monasteries under the pretext of their being an obstacle in the way of spreading the

"Mao-think." Numerous holy Buddhist places were desecrated and the Dankiang-rei and Romoch Monasteries were destroyed.

Buddhist statues (some dating back over a 1000 years) were desecrated wherever they fell into the hands of the red guards. The situation is still tense in Tibet at present. According to foreign journalists, at the beginning of 1967 the troops commanded by Chang Kuo-hua came out against the Maoists, arrested and expelled all red guards and retained control over Tibet for some time.

The situation in Inner Mongolia is much the same. After Suiyuan and Jehu Provinces had been liquidated and joined to Inner Mongolia, the number of Chinese grew considerably. Besides, many Chinese were moved there (at present there are more Chinese in Inner Mongolia than Mongols—10.5 out of the 12 million). There is not a single "standard" (administrative unit) without Chinese.

Ulanfu, Politbureau candidate member of the CC CPC and long-time leader of the local Communist Party organization and his two Mongol deputies—Kueipi and Biligebatur—have been removed and are being viciously attacked by red guards' papers. The same lot befell all Mongol Party workers even at the level of district organizations. Red guards' leaflets say that Ulanfu contemplated the "secession of Inner Mongolia and making it a kingdom." Workers in literature and the arts were also persecuted.

Chinese Party workers who had not been "consistent enough" in conducting the policy of assimilation were likewise attacked.

Peking's harsh policy of the past few years and particularly the excesses of the "cultural revolution" have aroused vigorous resistance among the local population. The Mongols were also indignant over some acts of plunder.

Even before, the Chinese settlers had ploughed up large grazing areas thus displacing traditional cattle-breeding, on instructions from Peking. The Peking leaders have never seriously concerned themselves with diversified development of the region. Inner Mongolia still remains one of the most backward provinces of China.

The Mongol public have been seriously alarmed at the Chinese leadership's open assertion that "the Mongolic language and script are short-lived" and that "in the not too distant future the Mongolic language will come off the historical scene." The Mongols' striving for national equality, proclaimed by the Constitution of the Chinese People's Republic, is regarded as "local nationalism" and "nationalistic splitting activities."

The desire to save the national culture is also being condemned as service "in the interests of the overthrown reactionary, dominating classes." The staging of Mongolian plays has been banned and Mongolian newspapers and magazines are closing down.

But the fate of the peoples of Sinkiang has been even more tragic.

Only recently six million people lived in Sinkiang—a sixth of Chinese territory. Four million of them were Uigurs and the rest, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks, Tatars, Dungans and a small number of Chinese. According to present-day reports, the population of Sinkiang has grown to 8 million,

half of whom are Chinese settlers.

The Chinese leadership intends to complete the forced assimilation of the native population. This plan is being carried out at a mad pace. Eye-witnesses tell that on some days up to 300 Chinese arrive from the central provinces at Urumchi alone. The Uigur population is being moved to other regions. But compulsory resettlement is only one form of forced assimilation. There are other widely practiced measures. For example, Uigur or Kazakh girls are compelled to marry only Chinese. Differentiated food-rationing is also used in the chauvinistic policy of discrimination: Chinese are entitled to 600 grams of millet a day, while the rest of the Sinkiang population receive only 300 grams.

The Mao group is out to destroy the national culture of Sinkiang. Chapters dealing with national poets and writers are removed from the textbooks; the history of the peoples of Sinkiang is being "rewritten;" "Outline History of the Uigurs" was published in 1965, echoing the racial theories of Chiang Kai-shek; unique Uigur manuscripts have been removed to Peking. Red guard outrages have made the situation in Sinkiang even graver. Red guards from Peking raided and closed down all the eight mosques in Urumchi. They "issued" an order to do away with religion and prepare the mosques for destruction. The red guards broke into the mosques and pulled out old men by their beards.

Great-Han chauvinism showed itself especially ugly in the persecution and extermination of the national Party cadres. This policy was conducted in several campaigns beginning from 1952. The

resistance offered by the local population frightened the leaders and in 1957 they began mentioning "excesses" and "mistakes" in their "class policy." But later the extermination of the national cadres was resumed and developed into a virtual orgy during the "cultural revolution." Foreign journalists report that Sinkiang is covered with a network of concentration camps, in each of which thousands and tens of thousands of Uigurs, Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Dungans and others are detained.

The life of the Sinkiang farmers has been militarized. They are forced to go out to the fields and come back in formation, singing some 6 or 7 songs to the glory of Mao Tse-tung. "Anti-Chinese elements" must work in the fields 16 to 18 hours. In the spring of 1967 the Urumchi radio station announced that the "cultural revolution" in Sinkiang had entered a "new stage" and that the question of the spring sowing campaign had acquired "a decisive character." A Moslem holiday was abolished.

Although this information does not cover all the facts, there is no doubt that in their nationalities policy the Mao group act as a follower of the worst traditions of the feudal and Kuomintang rulers. It is no wonder therefore that the "cultural revolution" has encountered particularly vigorous resistance in the national regions, thus furnishing fresh proof of the bankruptcy of Mao Tse-tung's anti-popular policy.

"Culture? No, the Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung!"

"The Chinese must enjoy both the culture of Rome and the culture of Greece and the two-thou-

sand-year culture of China," said former official of the CC CPC apparatus Chou Yang in 1959. When in July 1966, Chou Yang was called "one of the leaders of the anti-Mao Tse-tung course in ideology" (during the climax of the "cultural revolution"), those words of his were used along with others as proof of his complicity in "counter-revolutionary conspiracy."

As a matter of fact everything has been done these last two years to make people stop wondering over such "accusations."

Long before the 'red guards' outrages, when the "little pioneers of the revolution" were diligently attending schools or universities without suspecting that they would have to carry out a "great historical mission," the Chinese press had already declared war on the "opponents of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung." The classics of world literature and the arts were among the first to become such. Dozens of magazines launched a campaign "against the corpses." The works of Rabelais, Shakespeare, Balzac, Romain Rolland, Chekhov and Leo Tolstoy were banned as seditious since they "engendered pessimistic sentiments, idealism and egoism." While anathematizing these names the Chinese papers declared that it was criminal to "laud humanism, freedom, equality and fraternity because it is these sentiments that influence the part of the youth poisoned with bourgeois ideology," i.e. young people not mature enough to implement the Mao "stainless screw" idea.

The defamation of the classics served in a way as a basis for a new campaign directed primarily against Soviet literature and its masters known

and enjoyed by the Chinese people. Sholokhov, Simonov, Ehrenburg and other writers and poets of different generations were condemned because their works did not accord with the "thoughts of Mao Tse-tung." They went so far as to assert that all Soviet literature "had completely degenerated and become an accomplice of American imperialism." Chinese classical works of prose, poetry and dramaturgy written ages ago and containing humanist ideas, were included in the category of those "not reflecting the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung," and hence "harmful." Practically all progressive Chinese literature of the last few decades was treated in the same manner.

But still there remained some people who doubted the correctness and necessity of what was going on before their eyes. Quite a number of doubters were found among writers, playwrights, historians, philosophers, economists, workers at cultural and ideological institutions and teachers. It was they who fell the first victims of the "purges" in 1964 and 1965. Evidently Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues realized that unless these people were removed they would not be able to achieve one of their main ends—"to reeducate the Chinese people and the entire Party in the spirit of the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

In 1965 the press began to pour out critical, "crushing" articles on cultural workers, both members of the CPC and non-Party members. Particularly vicious attacks were directed against the cultural workers of the older generation and active Communist Party members, among them playwright Tien Han, script writer Hsia Yan, Deputy Minister of Culture Lin Mo-han and Rector of the

Higher Party School of the CC CPC Yang Hsien-chen. There is a peculiar "logic" in these acts—the spirit of internationalism is particularly strong among people who have lived a long life and acquired considerable revolutionary experience, people who witnessed the elevation of the present-day leaders, those same leaders who pledged inviolable friendship with the Soviet Union. After Mao Tung, his successor Secretary of the CC CPC Lu Ting-i was removed from the post of Minister of Culture (he was made of stand before the mobs of jeering red guards as one of the "leaders of the counter-revolution.")

China did not even know the red guards when the best representatives of the Chinese intelligentsia were virtually pronounced politically unreliable and repressed in some form—from the humiliating "working over" and removal from posts up to compulsory expulsion to out-of-the-way rural areas.

The intellectuals whom fate took to the villages before June 1966 may consider themselves lucky. They have avoided the victimization which set in after the 11th plenum of the CC CPC. The picture described below is not an exception but the rule.

Summer in Peking. 40°C above zero. "Meetings in line with the struggle against members of the black band and their presentation for public denunciation" are taking place in the buildings of the Writers and Artists Association, the Peking Exhibition and at colleges. (As a matter of fact such meetings are also being held at present). Attending are all those who wish from the organizations and residential districts to which no-

tifications have been sent. The walls are decorated with hand-written texts, listing the names of the "criminals" and their "crimes." In this way the spectators can familiarize themselves with the "charges" even before the trial begins. The procedure begins as a group of the accused, wearing black boards on their chests, are lined up on one side of the stage. The Chairman asks the audience to read a few excerpts from the "Thoughts of Mao Tse-tung" in chorus. Then the first in the list of the criminals is led to the middle of the stage and forced to bend his head. After that the man's head is jerked up by the hair so that everyone can see his face. If the "criminal's" head has been shaved in prison style he is hit in the chin from below. The Chairman announces that so and so members of the "black band" will be tried today. The spectators are asked to express their wrath and indignation out loud.

The "criminal" is compelled to confess his "crimes." People yell at him and interrupt him: "That's a lie! Stick to the truth! Death to him!"

As a rule the accused admits that he has committed "revisionist mistakes," "suppressed the Chairman's ideas" etc., that is, confesses whatever the mob is expecting.

Some are forced to stand on their knees after which they are led to the other side of the stage where they have to stand for several hours for general observation, guarded by the red guards, and holding a tablet indicating their names and "crimes." Older people—and they are the majority—can hardly endure the procedure.

In some places, the Peking University for one, the organizers of the trial made some changes in

the procedure, as prompted by their imagination. A "living exhibition" of the members of the "black band" was arranged in the University court-yard. People were lined up in two files, with tablets on their chests and backs. They were made to stand there from morning till night with a short break for the guards. Red guards from other towns were shown the "exhibition" in groups and girl-guides made explanations, poking their pointers in the faces of the "scoundrels."

At colleges of arts well-known critics and artists were forced to crawl on the ground, weed the grass at sports grounds, dig holes and clean toilets. Teenage overseers urged the exhausted people on by yells and sticks.

Mobs of rampant red guards, provided with lists of "suspects" by the security service, broke into the houses of cultural workers destroying everything they could get their hands on, jeering at the heads of the households and their families. Lao She, author of *The Rickshaw*, composer Ho Lu-ting, and actor Chou Hsin-fang committed suicide. Only a few people, among them composer Ma Ssu-tung, managed to flee.

Social origin has also been made a formal pretext for persecution. The entire population has been divided into "five red" and "five, six, seven black categories." It goes without saying that most intellectuals are included in the "blacks". The red guards obtain the lists of such people at police stations, after which these people are as good as dead. Anything can happen to them—they may be beaten up, their property may be confiscated, they may be driven out of town or even tortured to death.

That is how the Mao group are deliberately removing the more conscious citizens from social and political affairs. The main "guilt" of these people is that they are able soberly to assess the situation and realize the discrepancy between Mao theories and practices and the national interests. That such sentiments are very strong is clear even from the fact that until now Kuo Mo-jo has been the only one to publicly admit his mistakes and confess his sins. No intellectual has followed his example.

During the unprecedented campaign of political reprisals the accusation of "counter-revolutionary conspiracy" became the favourite. Naturally, not a single fact to prove it was provided by the papers or by the leaders of the "cultural revolution."

The gravest crime in China today is opposition to the Mao cult. Cultural workers and directors of ideological institutions were the first to be accused of this crime.

For example, the list of "crimes" of Chou Yang contained the accusation that he had halted the publication of "the Chairman's works." What an outrage!—by 1961 only nine million copies of them had been published and in 1962 they comprised only 0.5 per cent of the entire literature printed in China because of "the obstacles erected by Chou Yang." Another crime was contained in his words: "it is too difficult for the workers, farmers and soldiers to read the *Selected Works* of Chairman Mao."

Chou Yang was also reminded that he had been opposed to turning the Museum of the Chinese Revolution into the Museum of Mao Tse-tung. While

inspecting the exhibition before the opening, Chou Yang had remarked: "Why all those quotations from Chairman Mao, hanging everywhere like labels!" And when he saw a huge statue of Mao erected in the very first hall he said: "You should not have the Chairman as a sentry at the entrance."

Another "conspirer," Lin Mo-han, said that it was a simplification to assert that success in any concrete field of work and in any scientific discovery was a "victory of the ideas of Mao Tse-tung."

The guilt of many literary workers consisted in that they did not assess the situation in the country as directed from above. In 1966, speeches of writers at the 1962 Conference on Literature and Arts of North-East China were unearthed and a "conspiracy" was again disclosed. At their conference the writers had said that hard times had come for the peasants, that the Mao Tse-tung's "general line" was a desire to get rich in a split second, that the "great leap forward" was a 12-point storm and doping and the "people's communes", a dangerous spurt. They also complained that they were forced to depict positive characters in an extremely primitive manner, that their heroes were permitted to perform only exemplary acts, that for them there was to be no difference between day and night which made them look like mental cases. One of the now "exposed" writers expressed the idea this way: "when we depict a positive hero it is like puffing out a pig. It swells and fills out, then it is shaven and all the shortcomings are shaven off with the bristles. The pig turns out fat and glossy, but dead."

The charge against Ho Lu-ting, former Direc-

tor of the Shanghai Conservatoire and well-known composer, is based on his "harmful" statement that at present "a simplified and one-sided approach to the arts is being observed in China," that "the feeling of reality has been lost—people write too fast and their works lose their value as fast."

Hundreds of such statements published by Chinese papers, leaflets and posters as "incriminating material" against the "conspirers" show that a large number of Chinese cultural workers oppose the adventurous policy that the Mao group are imposing on the nation. And that is enough to prove a "conspiracy" in China nowadays.

The current reprisals are directed against anyone attempting to uphold the Marxist-Leninist approach to culture. The Peking rulers intend to eradicate any views on culture other than their own. And those latter reduce China's culture to the "Mao-think."

No wonder, one of their "appeals" called for "the burning of all books that did not reflect the thoughts of Mao Tse-tung."

The red guards, made for a time a basic tool to accomplish the "cultural revolution," were used deliberately to destroy historic and art values. But that was not enough for the Mao group. They sought to humiliate, terrorize and suppress the "unorthodox."

Chinese culture is today stricken with paralysis. Associations of writers, artists and other creative workers have been terminated and their leaderships, smashed. Many theatres and film studios have been shut down and all that is shown on the screen is Mao swimming, the red guards and nuc-

lear explosions. Hardly any literary and art journals or fiction is published while all that was printed before 1966 is banned or suspect. Many secretly throw any books out of their libraries that are not the "works of the Chairman."

On the other hand, the red guards have insisted that Mao's picture be displayed in every office and yard and in every room in private homes. They chant quotations from his writings by heart, forcing others to follow suit. They even dance to the accompaniment of this chanting.

It is being impressed on the red guards that Mao's main enemy is anyone trying to think. The whole "trouble" of culture and cultural workers is that that is exactly what they try to achieve. The red guards and their masterminds do not seem to realize that living thought cannot be repressed by either threat or force.

No Mao without Mao Cult

The boys and girls comprising the backbone of the red guards have very hazy notions about socialism and communism. Discontented with a miserable life devoid of prospect, they need an outlet for their energy, which is what Mao is trying to capitalize on. It is alarming that these semi-literate young people, or at least most of them, blindly believe that they are furthering a great and radiant cause and that their outrages are contributing to the "proletarian revolution." These kids do not have the faintest idea of what the working class is, they innocently repeat the words prompted from above: "Red guards are the vanguard of

the proletariat." But the time will come when these youngsters will sober up and, free of the hangover, some will be overcome with terrible disappointment and some will become outright careerists without anything sacred in their souls. These children proudly call themselves "pioneers" and "rebels." They are flattered by the part of iconoclasts, not realizing that they are pitiful idolaters.

Much of their behaviour is to be explained by the fact that for years the ordinary Chinese have been conditioned to the idea that Mao Tse-tung is an infallible divinity. During the "cultural revolution" the Mao cult swelled to enormity and became appallingly ugly. The "cultural revolution" itself would have been impossible but for this cult which is at once its banner and source.

The Mao cult in China is associated with the crudest violations of the democratic standards of Party, state and public life. It is no secret that the Mao top is consistently imposing military order on the Party, emphasizing that a Party worker should be a "commander" and act accordingly, hence he is also to carry out unquestioningly all orders from above and to observe subordination of a military type.

Mao Tse-tung's opponents are compelled to keep within the limits of his "thoughts" even when they criticize some aspects of his policy and swear by his name whenever they can. The atmosphere of the Mao cult and his idolization engenders bigotry, falsity and hypocrisy. It is also an ideal situation for dishonest people, toadies and careerists to worm their way into the Party and state apparatus. The rapid changing of political and

economic slogans, while simultaneously impressing on the people that the Mao policy remains unchanged and is infallible, confuses them and makes them absolutely incapable of seeing the truth. The Communist Party of China, which used to be an organization of conscious, politically well-educated and principled fighters for the implementation of the ideas of socialism, is degenerating into a herd of obedient sheep, blindly following their shepherd. Formerly a body of conscious Communists jointly working out their programme and political line, they are becoming unscrupulous executors of the will of the absolute leader. Violations of the CPC Rules has become a regular practice and nobody dares to protest. Moreover, the whole present-day campaign is intended to freeze the state of affairs for all time.

The collective brain of the Party is being replaced by one-man arbitrariness. All who at one time or another tried to defend the principles of Marxism-Leninism and Leninist standards in Party affairs, are being driven out of the Party. Consequently it is deprived of any possibility of taking part in outlining the policy or influencing political orientation. No Party congresses or conferences are held; the CC plenums are merely formal gatherings, the sole purpose of which is fervently to approve Mao's directives. A situation arises in which it is not the one elected by the Party that feels responsible before the Party and people but the Party and people feel obliged to please a single person.

Mao's objective is once more to isolate the Chinese people and the Communists of China from the outside world so that nothing can give rise to

doubts as to the "greatness" and "infallibility" of his "thoughts." Maoism is proclaimed the "acme of Marxist-Leninist science," "the supreme stage in the development of Marxism-Leninism," a "universal teaching" that can be equally useful in all fields of science and technology, production and life, culture and the arts. This "teaching" is to determine the development of China and the whole world for ages and even millenniums to come.

The tide of nationalism and idolization of Mao Tse-tung bars people, who have in any way acted contrary to Mao's directives, from leadership. The same tide brings hypocrites of the type of Lin Piao, Chen Po-ta and Kang Sheng to power. It is not unlikely that these people will have to abandon their leader in time, but right now they are the main defenders of Mao Tse-tung, the leaders and inspirers of the "cultural revolution." It is they that have been entrusted with the "general purge" and "reshuffling" of the entire Party and state apparatus. The red guards are merely a blind instrument in their hands used to charge the atmosphere of general fear.

The idolization of Mao Tse-tung interferes with the Chinese Communist Party's learning a lesson from the mistakes it has committed, prevents it from objectively assessing the road it has covered. Such is the source of aggravation of its mistakes and of more set-backs.

In a situation when only one man has the power to take a decision concerning the destiny of a 700-million nation, the feeling of indifference to what is going on in the Party and the country and political apathy is growing among the working peo-

ple. This is what enables the red guards to indulge in arbitrariness without fear of the consequences.

There was a time when the Chinese leaders, at least in words, acknowledged that the idolization of one man, the cult of his personality was alien to the nature of socialism and incompatible with Marxism-Leninism. Expressing support for the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress, the Chinese leaders wrote: "The personality cult is a rotten heritage of the long history of humanity. Its source is not only in the exploiting classes but also among small producers, for it is a fact that despotism of the head of the patriarchal family is the product of the economy of small-scale production. After the dictatorship of the proletariat has been established, the exploiting classes liquidated, small-scale economy replaced by collective economy and a socialist society built, some old, rotten survivals carrying the poison of the old ideology still persist in people's consciousness for a long time. The force of habit of millions and tens of millions of people is the most terrible force. The personality cult is also a manifestation of habit of the millions and tens of millions."

That was written in 1956. It is better not to remember it in China today. Today the "rotten" and "poisonous" old survivals have been announced the basis of the official policy and an ideological pivot of the "great proletarian cultural revolution."

The "cultural revolution" is the result of the Mao leadership's complete inability to settle the bitter contradiction between the low economic and cultural levels and China's position of a great

world power. Historical experience shows that such a contradiction cannot be settled within just a few years, inasmuch as it involves radical transformation of the social structure, elimination of the survivals of feudalism and capitalism, modernization of agriculture and industry, raising the living and cultural standards of hundreds of millions of people, overcoming petty-bourgeois ideology and psychology and cultivation of a socialist way of life. Before the "cultural revolution" the leaders of the Communist Party of China realized they could not hope quickly to overcome this contradiction. The "great leap forward" was prompted by the desire to solve it artificially. It failed. The "cultural revolution" signifies another attempt to solve that same contradiction by patently useless, adventurous methods. Apparently the idea Mao Tse-tung and his group have in mind is to freeze the present-day low standard of living for many years to come, and having secured the absolute dominance of Maoism and a complete submission to the ruling group, to use the bulk of the national income to develop the war industry potential, build up the armed forces and consolidate the entire machinery of power.

The Schism Gimmick and Its Results

Recent developments in China have distinctly demonstrated that its foreign policy, too, rests on bellicose nationalism and chauvinism and hegemonic hankerings.

In this respect the "cultural revolution" may be

viewed as a new phase in the Maoist drive against the world communist movement and the national-liberation movement, a phase of outright antagonistic confrontation.

It was back in the second half of the 50's that Mao developed his practical scheme of securing hegemonic supremacy. Of course, he had nursed such plans before but it was precisely in this period that they became definitely clear. Mao's objective in this first phase was to subordinate to himself all the revolutionary detachments of today and foist upon them, and firstly the Communist Parties, his own platform and leadership.

Mao and his supporters believed they would be able to achieve this aim by opposing their ostensibly "consistent revolutionary" home and foreign policies to the CPSU general line, the experience of the USSR and the other socialist nations, the practice of fashioning a new society.

In defiance of directives that the fraternal Parties had jointly drafted, and more specifically, of the thesis that an international detente and peaceful coexistence of countries with different social systems were vital for successful socialist construction, the Mao group tried to flaunt its own special line of aggravating international tensions.

Indeed, it was none other than Mao himself who suggested probing capitalism's strength by use of force as early as 1957. In so doing he proposed ignoring the possible death of hundreds of millions of people in the event of a nuclear holocaust. At the same time the Chinese leadership came out against the conclusions which the CPSU had drawn at its 20th Congress as to the likelihood of a peaceful road in the development of

revolution. True, at that time they did not dare to say so openly. This happened later, in 1960 when Mao and his men launched a frontal attack against the principle of peaceful coexistence, putting forward their slogan of the inevitability of war instead; these views were formulated in April 1960 in the notorious Peking booklet, *Long Live Leninism*.

It stands to reason that these calls for a resolute struggle against imperialism, the negation of peaceful coexistence and the peaceful development of the revolution, etc., were needed primarily as a smokescreen to camouflage chauvinistic and hegemonic designs.

Expressed in this as well as in other "theories" was a characteristic feature of the Mao group, one we have mentioned earlier: theory is purely a means to the end. For this reason, points of theory, slogans and doctrines are formulated depending on tactical aims. Accordingly one or another formula can be interpreted by Mao and his supporters in a sense diametrically opposed to the original meaning. Meanwhile the true objectives are thoroughly camouflaged in verbosity.

Such was the case again in 1960. The idea now was to bring about a "brink" regardless of China's national interests and regardless of the interests of the socialist camp; this was understood as providing the most favourable conditions for expediting a war industry build-up and for exalting China.

This was precisely the aim of the racket the Mao leadership staged in the Taiwan Straights in the autumn of 1958. Of course one may believe that one reason was of a domestic nature—a

desire to spur on the "great leap forward" with the threat of an early war. Still the prime objective was as before that of worsening the international situation. What results were achieved are well known. Taiwan is still occupied while the US military took advantage of the occasion to reinforce their positions in this part of the Far East. Only the USSR's firm stand prevented a possible grave armed conflict. This will also explain the circumstances that led to the Sino-Indian border conflict of 1958 when these two great Asian powers balanced on the brink of war. To this day it is clear that of no small importance was the craving of the Maoist upper crust to dislodge the socialist countries, particularly the USSR, from its line of peaceful coexistence and at the same time divert attention inside the country from the now cognizable blight produced by the policy of the "great leap."

These examples give an idea of how the Chinese foreign policy crystallized and was conducted, a policy which boiled down to creating Peking-controlled trouble-spots, in other words, to obtain the instrument of pressure on international relations and of political chicanery.

But the realities would not fit into the Mao-prescribed patterns. In the first place the socialist countries correctly assessed and rejected this foreign policy, thus upsetting Mao's illusion of involving the socialist countries and their military power in his schemes. China's international prestige was seriously damaged in the eyes of the progressive public and the leaders of the developing countries who were among the first to learn the lesson of Peking chauvinism and adventur-

ism. As for the communist movement it categorically denounced Mao's anti-Marxist practices through the representatives of an overwhelming majority of the Communist Parties as early as 1960.

Such in rough outline are the results of the first phase of the splitting activities undertaken by the Chinese leadership with Mao at the top. Politicians, viewing events through the sober eyes of common sense and cherishing national interests would have profited by heeding the just criticism coming from the Chinese people, but Mao preferred to step up his schismatic activities and depart still further from the communist movement and the socialist community.

Failing to secure their objective of world supremacy in 1957-60 the Mao group resolved to adopt other tactics. The programme document of what may be called the Mao creed is the "proposals concerning the general line of the international communist movement" published in 1963. The gist of this new political phase is a switch by the Mao group to a policy of directly splitting the communist movement. This was now a policy of outright political struggle against the USSR and the other socialist countries, and a practical attempt to knock together a pro-Chinese bloc of countries and parties.

The Maoists attached particularly great hopes to achieving domination over the national-liberation movement in the developing countries. Mao believed the halo of the victorious leader of the Chinese revolution would serve to isolate the national-liberation movement from other present-day progressive elements and above all, from

the socialist community and the international working class. Cheap demagoguery and jingoism served as the basic methods in attempts to dictate to the countries of the "third world" and transform them into a cat's paw of Peking.

The point of departure in the Peking drive on Asia, Africa and Latin America was quite simple—the thesis of "the decisive role of the world village" in the world revolutionary process. This thesis is nothing but an attempt to revise the Marxist-Leninist concept of the hegemony of the proletariat in the revolution. Believing in the absolute and universal character of the Chinese revolution Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues began to assert that "the village alone was the revolutionary base from which revolutionaries should begin their march for winning the final victory."

Another important point in the theories of the Peking "strategists of the revolution" was the assertion of the necessity of an armed struggle in all parts of Asia, Africa and Latin America under the pretext that a "splendid revolutionary situation had arisen" in all those countries. The tragic events in Indonesia following September 30, 1965 showed the consequences of applying such recommendations.

But Peking did not learn its lesson from that bitter example. Moreover, stubbornly persisting in the desire to force their fallacious methods on others, the Mao group worked out a series of pseudo-revolutionary, but actually adventurous and reactionary directives, a summarized version of which was given by Lin Piao in an article entitled *Long Live the Victory of the People's War*

published in September 1965. If the "theory of the people's war" is cleared of the verbal camouflage, it discloses an attempt to use the forces of the national-liberation movement as an instrument in creating seats of tension in different parts of the world, such as would provoke an armed conflict with American imperialism. The Chinese leaders believed that in such a situation they would be able to lead the anti-American struggle and play for influence on the modern world while actually remaining uninvolved. This gambling policy combined with open anti-Sovietism is intended to win an exceptional place for China in the world and influence world politics even before China's military and economic potential reaches a high level. The Maoists' chauvinism is most vividly displayed in their approach to the Vietnam issue. They need a lengthy war in Vietnam for the implementation of their plans in the international arena. On the one hand, they renounce unity of action with the socialist countries and persistently worsen their relations with the Soviet Union. On the other hand, they are doing everything in their power to prevent a political solution of the Vietnamese problem in the interests of the Vietnamese people, and for the sake of world peace. When the Vietnamese leaders outlined (at the beginning of 1967) the terms for the opening of negotiations with the United States on political adjustment, Peking did not support that move and, moreover, hinted that it would oppose it.

In the final analysis Mao Tse-tung's stand on Vietnam is objectively identical with the stand of the American political and military leaders

who insist that the war must go on at any cost.

At the same time it is remarkable that Peking makes use of various occasions to remind Washington of the "inadvisability" of a direct Sino-American conflict over Vietnam. And it finds understanding there.

In an interview to Edgar Snow, the American publicist, at the beginning of 1965, Mao Tse-tung himself hinted rather obviously that China was not going to fight outside her boundaries. In 1967 high-ranking officials impressed the same point time and again, varying one and the same idea: do not touch us and we will not touch you. This position was approved in Washington. In 1966 McNamara said that the United States would spare no effort publicly and confidentially to inform the Chinese leadership of the limited nature of US objects in Vietnam, which presented no danger to the Chinese People's Republic.

If all the components of Chinese policy on Vietnam are combined, the inevitable conclusion will be that the Mao group are objectively encouraging escalation of the war in Southeast Asia.

The Mao group's degradation has ended, as it was bound to, in cynical deals, adventurism and betrayal of the interests of a neighbouring socialist country for the sake of their selfish interests.

Ignoring the national interests of China is another aspect of Peking's political programme which has become increasingly obvious these last few years. Ever since the beginning of the 60's Mao Tse-tung began to lead China along the harmful road of isolation from the socialist community.

This is borne out by the figures on trade and

other forms of China's foreign economic relations with the socialist countries. China's trade turnover with them had dwindled three times between 1959 and 1965, that is, from three to one thousand million roubles.

The Mao design for the development of China dooms the country to a low rate of economic development and disproportions in its national economy. The situation is worsened by the fact that Mao Tse-tung and his supporters display particular interest in the industries that are connected with the manufacture of armaments, especially expensive ones, thus placing the heavy burden of nuclear armament on the people.

In an atmosphere of increasing self-isolation the Maoists turn more and more often to the capitalist countries and the latter, naturally, are only too glad to profit from this not only economically but also politically.

In 1966 the share of Chinese trade with capitalist countries comprised 73 per cent of the entire foreign trade turnover, whereas in 1957 it was only about 35 per cent.

It is a fact that today China almost fully depends on deliveries of plant and even grain from the capitalist countries.

For its part China supplies western countries and Japan with tungsten, tin and tung oil which has a most varied use, even military.

Just as before, it was no problem to find a pretext for rapprochement with the imperialist monopolies. Another theory of "intermediary zones" was cooked up in Peking. Clearly contradictory to Leninism, this "theory" announces that the policies of the monopoly bourgeoisie have

lost their imperialist character (US monopolies excluded). The contradictions that have been existing between the imperialist powers for a long time now and the European monopolies' striving to retain and consolidate their position in competition with the American monopolies, are absolutized and interpreted as manifestations of "anti-imperialism." This "theory" serves as a screen for the Mao group to use the schemes of the more reactionary bourgeois circles in a number of imperialist countries in its interests. It was for good reason that Mao Tse-tung supported the territorial claims advanced by some Japanese and West German politicians. Another odious fact is that the Peking leaders support even those few imperialists that come out against agreements on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and ban on nuclear weapon tests.

While gradually reorienting its foreign policy the Peking group launched an unprecedented campaign of schism. In 1963 and 1964 several small staffs were set up abroad to publish newspapers and magazines on Chinese money. Official Chinese missions abroad, Chinese emigrants, etc. are used in the splitting campaign.

Chinese delegations and representatives in international democratic organizations have become notorious. In an attempt to drive a wedge between the whites and the "coloured" they even resort to racist slogans of the type of "Asia for Asians."

Of late years the Maoists have intensified their attempts to subject the Afro-Asian solidarity movement to its influence by spreading the idea of setting up a "new revolutionary organization

of united nations" for Asian and African countries.

But Peking has failed in imposing its hegemony on the revolutionary and the national-liberation movements. A series of significant foreign political setbacks following one after another sped up the final disclosure of Mao Tse-tung's adventurism and chauvinism that have brought about China's isolation from the progressive forces of today.

Chinese leaders' voyages to Asian and African countries in 1964 were a complete fiasco. The Peking platform was not accepted and Mao Tse-tung was made to understand that his hopes for hegemony in that part of the world were futile.

Only three delegations out of 52 supported the Peking line at the session of the Council of the Afro-Asian Solidarity Organization in Nicosia in 1967. Not long before that delegates to the First Solidarity Conference of Asian, African and Latin American Countries in Havana categorically rejected China's claims to a dominant position in the solidarity movement on the three continents.

Peking's plans to create tension along the Indo-Pakistani border failed as well. Despite Peking's activities the political adjustment in that part of the world still further undermined China's influence on independent countries.

Thus the foreign policy miscalculations and serious setbacks in home policy coming year after year, expose the bankruptcy of Mao's platform and the adventurism of his practices. Developments show that despite the harm the splitters are doing, the harm to themselves is still greater.

The Chinese people have to pay dearly for the fallacious policy of their present-day leaders.

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To sum up, it is clear that the Mao group's policy constitutes a complete breaking away with the principles of scientific socialism. It distorts the ideas of socialism, destroys its soul, meaning and goal—the good of the people.

Undoubtedly, the degradation of the Mao group is to be explained on the one hand by their striving to win an exceptional role in the world, spread the monstrously fanned Mao cult to the rest of mankind and force not only the present but also coming generations to worship him; on the other hand, by their inability to organize creative, painstaking work over a long period, by a desire to solve involved problems at one stroke and if this fails to reject constructive solutions in general. They try to save their prestige and this makes them look for those responsible for the failures and setbacks everywhere and in everyone but never in themselves.

Judging by facts, Mao Tse-tung and his yes-men are least of all concerned about the destiny of socialism in China. They exploit the socialist ideas for their own narrow nationalistic purposes that have nothing in common with socialism. Mao cannot fail to realize that it is in socialism that millions of Chinese see a road to happiness and national rebirth. He gambles on this natural striving of the masses and uses it to strengthen his personal dictatorship and fan his own perso-

ality cult. But he and his supporters represent the defence of his personal power as defence of the socialist accomplishments of Chinese workers and peasants and a struggle against the restoration of capitalism and feudalism. The talk of socialism hardly conceals the dream of seeing China a great power before whose absolute leader the whole world lies prostrate in worship. But the irony of the situation is that the attempts to accomplish this dream by artificial and violent methods push the country far back. In our age, that of transition from capitalism to socialism, a time of scientific and technical revolution, Mao's distorted and primitive conceptions of socialism and the methods of its construction are not merely utopian but profoundly reactionary. The banner of Mao's "socialism" has no inscription of happiness, fraternity of nations, peace and friendship, but that of eternal poverty, discord, war and hostility.

For that reason Mao Tse-tung's ideas will not be accepted by the world communist movement and progressive humanity.